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ARTICLES
OF "PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS" AND THE
REGULATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS:
THE NORTH CAROLINA PLANNED
COMMUNITY ACT
PATRICK K. HETRICK*
"... every morning we start new buildings, new towers, new high-
ways and thus we make changes and commit the city for genera-
tions to come."
C. A. Doxiadis
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Enactment of the Planned Community Act (PCA)
With surprisingly little fanfare and notice by most members
of the practicing bar and general public, an extremely important
and comprehensive series of statutes, codified as the "North Caro-
lina Planned Community Act"2 were enacted into law with an
* Professor of Law, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell
University. B.S., 1967, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1971,
Marquette University. Professor Hetrick wishes to express his gratitude to
Elizabeth K. Arias for her help in editing this article.
1. ANTHROPOPOLIS - CITY FOR HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 3 (1975).
2. The North Carolina Planned Community Act, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws. 199
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F (1999). For ease of discussion, the North
Carolina Planned Community Act will be referred to as the "PCA" or the "Act"
throughout this article.
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effective date of January 1, 1999.' The bottom-line significance of
this new legislation is not immediately obvious when one engages
in a perusal of the twenty-plus pages of statutes that comprise the
Act. The following points must therefore be highlighted and
emphasized: The General Assembly has made possible a statutory
metamorphosis of the North Carolina law of planned communi-
ties. It has converted a confusing and restrictive menagerie of
appellate court decisions interpreting sometimes difficult and
complex common law real property concepts into a detailed, clear
code and enabling act for what the author believes may be best
described as statutorily authorized private neighborhood govern-
ments, homeowner associations with many of the functions of a
local municipality.4 By enacting a clear statutory foundation, the
General Assembly has given identity to an entity that has suffered
from a serious legal identity crisis.5
This article will highlight the countless instances in which
the Planned Community Act deviates in material ways from both
the Uniform Planned Community Act and the North Carolina
3. As will be discussed later in this article, parts of the PCA have
applicability to "planned communities" created prior to January 1, 1999. This is
a point that all attorneys practicing in the real property area will want to be very
familiar with. Ten months after the effective date of the PCA, this author had
two matters related to planned communities referred to him that were clearly
resolved by language in the new Act. Neither the parties nor attorneys involved
had any awareness of the existence of the PCA. In defense of their ignorance, the
process by which important legislation is communicated to the practicing bar and
public needs to be improved.
4. "Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum et incertum." (The law performs
miserably when it is vague and uncertain.) See Dr. J. Stanley McQuade, Ancient
Legal Maxims And Modern Human Rights, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75 (1996).
5. For an excellent, comprehensive article written by practitioners, see Wayne
S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis Of Community
Associations: In Search Of The Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 589 (1993), (where the authors at p. 593 note, in part: "This article is written
in response to a clear message running throughout discussions of community
association law - that community associations have an identity crisis."). The
"Editors' Synopsis" of this article notes that the authors "review and critique the
various models proposed for classifying common interest communities and,
drawing on their practical experience, suggest that community association law is
a unique construct." The authors also present "thirteen illustrative issues" faced
by every planned community. There are numerous law review and journal
articles published that shed light on planned communities. Some are highly
theoretical, some practical. A number of these will be referred to regularly
throughout this article.
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Condominium Act.6 Many of these variances and omissions
amount to a reinforcement of the power of the declarant and,
eventually, the owners' association. In the abstract, many con-
tribute to a fundamental shift in the balance of power from private
property owners to private governments. Discussions and sum-
maries of the Planned Community Act to date have not empha-
sized the numerous policy decisions that were consciously or
indirectly made when the General Assembly enacted the greatly
modified Act.
The Planned Community Act is much more - or much less, as
the case may be - than an amended version of the Uniform
Planned Community Act or the North Carolina Condominium Act.
Put another way, those other models for the PCA were not slightly
edited or modified to reflect the nuances of North Carolina tradi-
tion and law; rather, they have been in some respects eviscerated
in areas related to the consumer rights and powers of the individ-
ual lot owner in a planned community.7 The changes and dele-
tions made in the final version of the PCA go well beyond prudent
legal tinkering and fine tuning and frequently amount to shifts of
a consequential nature from the main points and policies that
undergird the original uniform act.
As of this writing, there are few experts on the North Caro-
lina version of the PCA.' Neophytes are reading and rereading
the legislation and expertise will come with familiarity. Real
estate attorneys with practical experience in creating sophisti-
cated planned unit developments and similar forms of community
association subdivisions will immediately feel comfortable with
the format and requirements of the PCA. Others will want to
embark upon a patient and probing study before rendering legal
advice with reference to the new legislation. To the extent, there-
fore, that this article is written with a spirit of prophesy concern-
ing possible issues, trouble spots, and interpretations of the PCA,
6. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C (1987). There are numerous instances where PCA
provisions are substantially identical to counterpart provisions in the North
Carolina Condominium Act; indeed, the organization and language of Chapter
47C served as a model for Chapter 47F.
7. Because it does not cover condominiums, the PCA deals with owners as
"lot" rather than "unit" owners.
8. One of the few is Attorney Timothy G. Sellers of Delaney and Sellers, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina. See Timothy G. Sellers, North Carolina Planned
Community Act - A Primer, REAL PROPERTY SECTION ANNUAL MEETING (North
Carolina Bar Association Foundation Continuing Legal Education), 1999 at
chapter II.
1999]
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it is also offered with the intellectual humility of one who will
freely admit that different interpretations and viewpoints con-
cerning the effect of the PCA are likely and indeed, welcome.9 If
prior examples such as the North Carolina Condominium Act"°
are any indication, the PCA will not foster dozens of appellate
court decisions dealing with its terms.1 In the real life practice of
law, it will be the real property attorneys of this state who will
give practical meaning to these statutes through their day-to-day
application of the Act.
B. The PCA's Impact on the Real Estate Attorney
The PCA will have an immediate impact on most attorneys
specializing in real property law. Opportunities for serving the
needs of clients will be numerous and include the following:
(1) Creation of the PCA. Lawyers will be called upon to
advise developers concerning the most effective way to create a
planned community under the PCA. There are dozens of statutes
that allow the PCA documentation "to provide otherwise,"2 and
the attorney for the declarant will want to study these options.
Lawyers should also advise developers of the benefits of created a
planned community governed by the PCA as opposed to a condo-
minium or other land development format.
(2) Opting in to the PCA. Should existing planned communi-
ties "opt in" to the PCA? Lawyers will want to engage in providing
proactive advice to homeowners associations in pre-1999 planned
community developments.
9. The author can identify with Mark Twain, who while reading portions of
the United States Revised Statutes while on his way to Nevada to serve as
secretary to his brother, the Governor of the Territory, wrote: "I had many an
exciting day.., reading the statutes and the dictionary and wondering how the
characters would turn out." MARK TwAIN, ROUGHING IT, ch. 3, reprinted in M.
FRANCES McNAMARA, 2000 CLAssic LEGAL QUOTATIONS 489 (1992).
10. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C (1987).
11. The North Carolina Condominium Act applies to all condominiums
created in North Carolina after October 1, 1986. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-102(a)
(Supp. 1998). A majority of appellate court decisions in recent years have dealt
with condominiums established prior to that date under the old condominium
act, Chapter 47A of the North Carolina General Statutes. See Miesch v. Ocean
Dunes Homeowners Ass'n., 120 N.C. App. 559, 464 S.E.2d 64 (1995), cert. denied,
342 N.C. 657, 467 S.E.2d 717 (1996); Dunes South Homeowners Association, Inc.
v. First Flight Builders, Inc., 341 N.C. 125, 459 S.E.2d 477 (1995).
12. See infra Part II.E.
[Vol. 22:1
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(3) Retroactive Reach of the PCA. Lawyers who advise home-
owners associations and developers of pre-1999 planned communi-
ties will want to advise their clients of the many substantive
provisions of the PCA that apply to planned communities created
before January 1, 1999, the effective date of the Act.
13
(4) Procedures & Policies of Homeowners Associations.
Because the PCA lays out clear procedures and guidelines to be
followed in certain instances by homeowners associations, it is
important that the associations do follow them. The seat-of-the-
pants homeowners association that operates with complete infor-
mality is not a wise approach to running a planned community
under the new PCA. Attorneys specializing in this area may want
to consider offering a compliance package for planned communi-
ties to bring their documentation and practices in line with PCA
provisions. This will be particularly helpful to planned communi-
ties created before January 1, 1999. In any event, attorneys
should experience an increase in situations where they are
retained by homeowners associations.
1 4
(5) Advising Property Owners. Property owners in a PCA
have a status akin to that of citizenship in a private fiefdom. The
newly empowered and legislatively enabled homeowners associa-
tion can be a power to reckon with and should be viewed as the
private, rough equivalent of the governing body of a public munici-
pality. Disputes between individuals as unit owners and the asso-
ciation are inevitable. Attorneys advising property owners will
need to be comfortably familiar with the provisions of the PCA.
(6) Advising Prospective Purchasers. In North Carolina, as in
most states, the attorney does not get involved in the typical resi-
dential sales transaction until after the prospective purchasers
have signed their life away on the offer to purchase and contract.
This is unfortunate. Someone should be making prospective pur-
chasers aware of what they are getting into when they purchase a
13. The most significant retroactive application of the Act is found at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 (1999), "Powers of owners' association." The powers
enumerated in subsections (1) through (6) and (11) through (17) apply to planned
communities created prior to the January 1, 1999 effective date.
14. See Stubblefield & Hyatt, supra note 5, at 593 ("The continued
development of new communities and maturation of older communities have
resulted in more volunteer officers and directors seeking legal answers to
management issues. Naturally, that process significantly increased the number
of attorneys whose practices are heavily weighted with community association
clients and who seek appropriate bodies of law to provide at least guidance, if not
answers.").
1999]
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home or lot in a planned community. 15 Rules and regulations
exist in these planned communities that must be abided by. The
PCA empowers the homeowners' association to effectively enforce
them.
(7) Advising Municipal and County Governments. Public offi-
cials, including but not limited to those who serve in the planning
and zoning areas, need to be educated about both the growing
trend in planned community developments and the nature of
North Carolina's new statutory scheme for those communities.1"
From the standpoint of public policy, the impact of planned com-
munities on the greater public community should be considered.
What will the relationship between private and public govern-
ments be? How will planned communities affect the provision of
public services by the municipality or county?
C. Key Issues Under the PCA.
There are key issues that must be addressed in any introduc-
tory description and discussion of the PCA. For purposes of organ-
ization, the following points will be raised in an article by article
discussion of the new legislation:
Does the PCA effectively remedy problems associated with
pre-January 1, 1999 "planned communities"? Will it cure likely
problems associated with "planned communities" formed on or
after January 1, 1999? Should developers of residential property
in North Carolina favor the planned community form of develop-
ment over the condominium or basic subdivision format? Are
there sufficient policy considerations to justify the fundamental
shift in power to private governments authorized by the PCA? Is
the PCA too sweeping in its delegation of powers to the home-
owner association?
Are developers, declarants and homeowner associations suffi-
ciently accountable under the PCA? Are consumers - the pur-
chasers of residential property located in a PCA - adequately
protected in likely scenarios of conflicts within a planned commu-
nity? Is there an obligation to advise prospective purchasers of
15. This will be discussed again later in this article. It is the author's opinion
that the real estate agent, especially when denominated a "dual" or "buyer's"
agent, should make the prospective purchaser acutely aware of the benefits and
burdens of living in a planned community. Perhaps the organized bar can
educate the public in a more general way.
16. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-106 (1999) deals with the applicability of local
ordinances, regulations, and building codes to planned communities.
[Vol. 22:1
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property in a planned community concerning the effect of the PCA
on their private property rights? If so, who has this responsibil-
ity? What is the role of the closing attorney? The real estate
agent? The organized bar?
D. The Background and General Need for the PCA
It is estimated that one out of every six Americans (42 million
people) currently live in some form of common interest community
in which home or unit owners share ownership of common areas
and have obligations to help with the cost of maintaining and
repairing them. 17
Using a generic rather than official definition, a "planned
community" can be described simply as a real estate development
in which the individual lot owners have responsibilities for the
financial support of specified common areas and services. The
development can be residential only, both residential and com-
mercial, or commercial only.1 8 In the most common fact situation,
financial support for the infrastructure of the planned community
comes in the form of an annual assessment specified in private
covenants and restrictions running with and burdening each indi-
vidual lot. Each lot is usually also a beneficiary of these covenants
and restrictions. In addition to property law, sophisticated con-
temporary planned communities are also the product of contract
law. In theory, lot or unit owners agree to abide by rules and reg-
ulations and assent in advance to the incorporated or unincorpo-
rated structure of the homeowners' association. 19
The new statutory definition of a "planned community" is
found at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(23). That statutory subsec-
tion defines it as meaning "real estate with respect to which any
person, by virtue of that person's ownership of a lot, is expressly
17. Laura Castro Trognitz, Co-Opted Living, 85 A.B.A.J. 54, 55 (1999). Citing
statistics provided by the Community Associations Institute, this article
estimates a total of 205,000 associations in the country with the breakdown by
association type as of 1998 as follows: Condominium - 5,078,756, Cooperative -
748,840, and Planned Community - 10,562,964.
18. Planned communities can also include a resort development with a
combination of permanent residents in homes and short-term guests in resort
facilities. For an article describing one of the first planned communities in the
nation, see Lois Baron, A Window To The Past; Glencarlyn's Grasp on History
Appeals to Longtime Residents, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 22, 1999, at G 01.
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101 (1999) requires that every lot owners'
association created after the effective date of the PCA be organized as a nonprofit
corporation.
1999]
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obligated by a declaration to pay real property taxes, insurance
premiums, or other expenses to maintain, improve, or benefit
other lots or other real estate described in the declaration." 20
The technical legal definition of a "planned community," how-
ever, constitutes the trees and not the forest. These communities
are not merely subdivisions where a group of homeowners of a
similar ilk have agreed to pay mandatory assessments for planned
community land and services. Rather, these planned communities
have the capacity to be powerful private governments that rule
over the lives of residents in many significant ways. To rely on the
statutory definition, therefore, is to understate. One commentator
has observed:
Naturally, the number of legal problems associated with common
interest developments has accelerated with the increase of these
developments. These problems stem in part from residential asso-
ciation restrictions which have pervaded all aspects of residents'
lives, from the provision of services and amenities to the control of
behavior outside and inside the individual unit. Further, the all-
encompassing scope of the associations's control over residents has
frequently provoked both courts and commentators to view resi-
dential associations as miniature private governments. As com-
mon interest developments proliferate, their characteristics as
residential governments pose questions about longstanding rela-
tionships between the individual and the community, and of pri-
vate groups to the public as a whole. 2 1
According to the official report on the Uniform Planned Com-
munity Act, planned communities, although similar to condomini-
ums, "have operated for years under the common law without the
benefit of statutory enablement, and in virtually all states, with-
out the regulatory burdens and consumer protection benefits
available to condominiums." 22 That report goes on to note:
The homeowner associations that administer such common law
planned communities often perform exactly the same functions as
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103 (23) (1999).
21. Todd Brower, Communities Within The Community: Consent,
Constitutionalism, And Other Failures Of Legal Theory In Residential
Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204 (1992).
22. Prefatory Note, Uniform Planned Community Act, p. 1. See also, Geis,
Codifying The Law of Homeowner Associations: The Uniform Planned
Community Act, 15 ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal (Winter
1980). This article is a report by a special subcommittee of the ABA Committee
on Condominiums, Cooperatives and Homeowner Associations which monitored
the drafting of the Uniform Planned Community Act.
[Vol. 22:1
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the condominium associations that administer statutory condo-
minium regimes. They derive their powers from a declaration of
covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&R declaration) which
is recorded at the beginning of the project and which relies for its
enforceability on the state common law governing covenants
which 'run with the land.' Not surprisingly, large portions of such
CC&R declarations are indistinguishable from condominium dec-
larations. The only basis on which CC&R regimes are exempted
from state and local condominium regulation is that title to the
common areas is held in the name of the homeowner association
instead of being divided among the unit owners as tenants in
common.
23
It should be added that planned communities have become
the preferred form of residential real estate development.2 4 In
spite of the inherent pitfalls and insecurity of drafting with regard
to the sometimes confusing and inconsistent common law of cove-
nants and restrictions,25 the benefits of a planned community to
developers and consumers alike have rendered it the organiza-
tional structure of choice in contemporary residential real estate
development. In addition, it is the format most preferred by local
government planning officials.
The popularity and rising use of the planned community for-
mat had a side effect of highlighting the shortcomings of tradi-
tional legal structures. It became obvious to attorneys
specializing in this area of law in North Carolina and throughout
the nation that the planned community organizational structure
could no longer rest solely on medieval foundations and attempts
by courts to adapt and fashion case law from simpler times to com-
23. Id.
24. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions For Old Neighborhoods, 48
Duke L.J. 75, 81 (1998) ("Residential community associations (RCAs) have been
greeted with resounding approval in new real estate developments. The number
of RCAs in the United States increased from fewer than 1,000 in 1960 to an
estimated 205,000 in 1998. By 1998, more than forty million Americans were
living within the jurisdiction of an RCA.") (Citations omitted.) See supra note 16
and accompanying text.
25. See Richard A. Epstein, Covenants And Constitutions, 73 Cornell L. Rev.
906 (1988) ("The law of covenants is the province only of a hardy band of real
estate lawyers with the temerity to master a complex and imposing body of rules;
vertical and horizontal privity; affirmative and negative covenants; matters in
esse and in posse; the touch and concern requirement; notice, actual and
constructive; and the ins-and-outs of recordation statutes.").
1999]
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plex contemporary real estate developments that have no common
law counterpart.2 6
To demonstrate one reason for the need for the PCA, a refer-
ence to North Carolina cases dealing with assessments and home-
owner associations is helpful. In a fairly typical North Carolina
decision on covenants, Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc,2 7 the Court of
Appeals reiterated the strict North Carolina rules concerning the
enforcement of affirmative assessment covenants. Lot owners
who took with full notice of an obligation to pay assessments to a
homeowners association challenged the validity of the assess-
ments. Citing earlier Court of Appeals decisions, Judge Lewis
noted that assessment provisions in restrictive covenants must:
contain a sufficient standard by which liability for assessments
can be measured, identify with particularity the property to be
maintained, and provide guidance to a reviewing court as to which
facilities and properties the association chooses to maintain with
the assessments.2 s
The assessment covenant in Allen reads in pertinent part as
follows: "The Buyer ... agrees to pay.. . $60.00. . ., said annual
charge being a reasonable, necessary and proportionate charge for
the maintenance, upkeep and operations of the various areas and
26. Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 303, 364 (1998) ("Changes in the law and in
industry practice contribute to the evolution both of the products available and to
the ways the community association process is structured and operated. These
'new realities' serve to override factors that have given rise to the negative
aspects of the common interest community. In addition, the new realities justify
if not compel constructive change.").
27. 119 N.C. App. 761, 460 S.E.2d 197 (1995).
28. Id. at 764 (citing Figure Eight Beach Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Parker,
62 N.C. App. 367, 376, 303 S.E.2d 336, 341 (1983); quoting Property Owners'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980)). See also Miesch
v. Ocean Dunes Homeowners Ass'n., 120 N.C. App. 559, 464 S.E.2d 64 (1995),
cert. denied, 342 N.C. 657, 467 S.E.2d 717 (1996), a case dealing with the former
North Carolina Condominium Act, Chapter 47A of the General Statutes. The
Court of Appeals affirmed a Superior Court finding that a condominium unit
owners association could not impose a "user fee" on short-term rentals of unit by
unit owners because there was no express authority - either in the condominium
governance documents or by specific statutory provision - for the imposition of
such a fee. Writing for the Court, Judge John C. Martin categorized these user
fees as covenants imposing affirmative obligations on the unit owners.
Therefore, they were to be strictly construed and not enforced without clear and
unambiguous language of authorization. The Court cited Property Owners'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
[Vol. 22:1
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facilities by Sea Gate Association, Inc. . ,,.9 The Court of Appeals
rejected this covenant as containing no standard by which the
Court could assess how the homeowners' association was to choose
which properties to maintain.3 °
There is no telling how many existing affirmative assessment
covenants would be found to be unenforceable under these and
other North Carolina appellate court decisions. This raises a
straightforward issue under the PCA. Is the Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc.
now a "planned community" for purposes of the PCA? Is the Sea-
gate development retroactively covered by some provisions of the
PCA31 and can Sea Gate "opt in" to full coverage under the PCA?32
While the legislature should not have to be concerned with incom-
plete or careless legal draftsmanship, a major flaw in the PCA is
its failure to create a strong presumption in favor of the validity of
all private covenants and restrictions (subject to public policy limi-
tations) associated with planned communities. Since the North
Carolina version of the PCA already deviates in significant ways
from the UPCA, it should have been drafted to eliminate some of
the existing problems with regard to the North Carolina approach
29. Allen, 119 N.C. App. at 764.
30. Allen, 119 N.C. App. at 764. Several hundred years of appellate court
decisions have unfortunately taken the law of equitable servitudes far beyond
the simple pronouncements of the landmark case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774,
41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). That case stands for the straightforward
proposition that purchasers who take with notice of restrictive covenants can be
required to honor them in equity. It would be inequitable to allow a purchaser to
disregard an obligation that he or she had clear notice of when acquiring the real
property.
31. Significantly, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47F-3-115 to -116 (1999)
with one exception, apply to planned communities created prior to January 1,
1999, whether or not they opt in to coverage by the entire PCA.
32. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102 (1999), "Applicability," provides as follows in
subsection (d):
(d) Any planned community created prior to the effective date of this
Chapter may elect to make the provisions of this Chapter applicable to it
by amending its declaration to provide that this Chapter shall apply to
that planned community. The amendment may be made by affirmative
vote or written agreement signed by lot owners of lots to which at least
sixty-seven percent (67%) of the votes in the association are allocated or
any smaller majority the declaration specifies. To the extent the
procedures and requirements for amendment in the declaration conflict
with the provisions of this subsection, this subsection shall control with
respect to any amendment to provide that this Chapter applies to that
planned community.
1999]
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to the enforceability of covenants at law and equitable
restrictions.
Enactment of the PCA does not signal by any means the end
of the use of covenants and restrictions as the foundational basis
for the rules governing those who reside in a planned community.
The fundamental improvement is that these familiar property law
concepts are now authorized and reinforced by statutory author-
ity. One might describe the situation as a statutory overlay super-
imposed on traditional rules of law and equity. A sample
introductory paragraph from a "Declaration of Planned Commu-
nity," for example, might now read as follows:
Buies Creek Developers, Inc., a corporation duly organized under
North Carolina Law ("Declarant"), hereby makes this Declaration
of a Planned Community pursuant to the North Carolina Planned
Community Act, Chapter 47F of the General Statutes, and this
Declaration of covenants, restrictions, conditions and rules ("Dec-
laration") establishing the planned community of Glacier Lake.
The above language is a vignette from the introduction sec-
tion of a declaration and is, of course, incomplete. While the decla-
ration for any planned community located in North Carolina is
subject to Chapter 47F of the General Statutes in any event, pru-
dent draftsmanship should nonetheless make reference to the
PCA in appropriate places. 3 Referring to Chapter 47F serves as a
consumer oriented disclosure device and as a reminder to attor-
neys and judges reviewing the governing documents that the
planned community governance structure now rests primarily on
a statutory foundation.34
33. In the opinion of this author, the practice of cross-referencing the Planned
Community Act should continue in the drafting of the bylaws of the association
and any additional rules and regulations of the planned community.
34. See William P. Sklar, Concept of Condominium Ownership, FLORIDA
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.5 1998 entitled "Declaration of
Condominium." Although dealing with condominium and not planned
community law, the author raises the issue of the theoretical basis for these
types of developments. He writes, in part: "A continuing debate exists about
whether the contents of the declaration are a series of servitudes including
easements, conditions, and running covenants, or merely are a creature of
statute following statutory requirements for the creation of the condominium
regime." (Citations omitted.) One response to this debate is that the contents of
the declaration fit well into both categories: traditional property law and modern
statutory reform. Later, at § 1.6, Sklar notes: "The power and authority of a
condominium association to act is a matter of statutory grant combined with
additional grants of authority under the declaration of condominium, articles,
[Vol. 22:1
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E. The Organizational Structure of the North Carolina PCA
The North Carolina Planned Community Act is organized into
three major articles: Article 1, "General Provisions," Article 2,
"Creation, Alteration and Termination of Planned Communities,"
and Article 3, "Management of Planned Community." Missing
from the North Carolina version of the PCA are Articles 4 and 5
from the Uniform Planned Community Act. Those articles respec-
tively deal with the areas of "Protection of Purchasers" and
"Administration And Registration." As noted earlier in this arti-
cle, the organization and format of the PCA tracks closely that of
Chapter 47C of the North Carolina General Statutes, The North
Carolina Condominium Act.
The author will therefore be referring at many times in this
article to the following related but distinct laws, comments and
uniform laws: (1) The Uniform Planned Community Act (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the "UPCA") approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1980, and the
starting point and source for many of the provisions of the North
Carolina Planned Community Act. It is important to note that the
North Carolina version is altered enough from the UPCA that it
can not carry the "uniform act" label.35 (2) The official comments
to the UPCA edited by the National Conference of Commissioners.
While these comments may be extremely helpful to efforts at
interpreting the North Carolina PCA, they are not the official
comments to the PCA as enacted in this state. (3) The North Car-
olina Planned Community Act (the "PCA" or the "Act"), codified as
Chapter 47F of the North Carolina General Statutes. (4) The com-
ments to the North Carolina PCA (hereinafter referred to as
"North Carolina Comment"). (5) The North Carolina Condomin-
ium Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Condominium Act") codi-
fied as Chapter 47C of the North Carolina General Statutes.
and bylaws of the condominium association." By analogy, the same is true of
planned communities.
35. Comment 1 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-101 (1999) reads:
This Act is based, in part, on the provisions of the Uniform Planned
Community Act. Many sections, however, have been substantially
revised from those that appear in the Uniform Act. Some other sections
marked "Reserved" contained provisions which were included in the
Uniform Act but were deemed inappropriate for inclusion in this Act.
Because of these differences, the Official Comments to the Uniform Act
have not been included.
1999]
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II. ARTICLE 1 OF THE PCA - "GENERAL PROVISIONS"
A. Contents of Article 1
Article 1 contains the official "short title" of the PCA,36 a sec-
tion dealing with the applicability of the PCA to existing and pre-
existing planned communities and the method by which pre-
existing planned communities can opt in,37 a statute containing
over two dozen key definitions,3 s statutory language dealing with
variation of the provisions of the PCA,39 a statute dealing with the
applicability of zoning ordinances, regulations and building
codes,4 ° a statute dealing with the effect of eminent domain,41 and
a statute noting that supplemental general principles of law are
applicable.42
B. The Central and Key definition: "Planned Community"
The all important central term, "planned community," is
defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(23) as meaning "real estate
with respect to which any person, by virtue of that person's owner-
ship of a lot, is expressly obligated by a declaration to pay real
property taxes, insurance premiums, or other expenses to main-
tain, improve, or benefit other lots or other real estate described in
the declaration."43 This statutory definition is one that should be
36. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1999) § 47F-1-101: "This Chapter shall be known and
may be cited as the North Carolina Planned Community Act."
37. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102 (1999)
38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103, which contains definitions for the following
terms: "allocated interests," "association" or "owners' association," "common
elements," "common expenses," "common expense liability," "condominium,"
"cooperative," "declarant," "declaration," "executive board," "leasehold planned
community," "lessee," "limited common element," "lot," "lot owner," "master
association," "person," "planned community," "purchaser," "real estate,"
"reasonable attorneys' fees," and "special declarant rights."
39. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-104 (1999).
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-106 (1999).
41. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107 (1999)
42. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-108 (1999) which reads:
The principles of law and equity as well as other North Carolina
statutes (including the provisions of the North Carolina Nonprofit
Corporation Act) supplement the provisions of this Chapter, except to
the extent inconsistent with this Chapter. When these principles or
statutes are inconsistent or conflict with this Chapter, the provisions of
this Chapter will control.
43. The statute qualifies the definition of "planned community" by excluding
the terms cooperative or condominium, although real estate comprising a
condominium or cooperative may be part of a planned community. Also, the PCA
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boldly emblazoned in the minds of all practitioners of real prop-
erty law. The PCA applies to all planned communities within
North Carolina.44 Specific statutory exceptions include develop-
ments of less than 20 lots4 5 and nonresidential developments.
46
The PCA clearly does not apply to planned communities or lots
located outside of North Carolina.4"
The PCA as enacted in North Carolina is not intended to
cover traditional condominium developments, although a condo-
minium regime can be a part of a PCA. Although no statutory
provision explicitly addresses this point, North Carolina Comment
2 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-101 does. It explains the exclusion as
follows:
It is understood and intended that any development which incor-
porates or permits horizontal boundaries or divisions between the
physical portions of the planned community designated for sepa-
rate ownership or occupancy will be created under and governed
by the North Carolina Condominium Act and not [the PCAI.
The UPCA on the other hand clearly includes the condomin-
ium form of ownership within the term "planned community."4"
excludes a leasehold interest of less than 20 years on a lot, including renewal
options. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103 (23). The Act only applies to certain
planned communities. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102. A planned community is
officially created by compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-101 (1999) by
executing a declaration in the same manner as a deed and properly recording it.
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(a).
45. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(b)(1) specifies that the PCA does not apply to
a planned community "[w]hich contains no more than 20 lots (including all lots
which may be added or created by the exercise of development rights) unless the
declaration provides or is amended to provide that this Chapter does apply to
that planned community. .."
46. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(b)(2) specifies that the PCA does not apply to
a planned community "[n which all lots are restricted exclusively to
nonresidential purposes, unless the declaration provides or is amended to
provide that this Chapter does apply to that planned community."
47. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(c).
48. In the "Prefatory Note" to the Uniform Planned Community Act, the
reporter warns "of the increasing and understandable inclination of developers,
in the fact of changing condominium legislation, to choose. .. alternative forms of
developing multi-owner projects." The decision to use a planned community
format for development avoids fractionalizing ownership of the common elements
and the additional costs associated with compliance with the consumer
protection aspects of condominium legislation.
In the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C (1987),
substantial consumer protections are set forth in Article 4, "Protection of
Purchasers." Consumer rights abound in the form of protections concerning
1999]
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Portions of the UPCA that deal with the condominium form of
ownership were excluded from the PCA, although one important
definition still remains that could cause confusion. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-1-103(25), part of the extensive definitions section of
the PCA, follows the UPCA by defining "real estate" - among
other things - as including ". . .parcels with or without upper or
lower boundaries, and spaces that may be filled with air or water."
Thus, in spite of the crux of Comment 2 to the PCA (i.e., that hori-
zontal boundaries must be established as condominiums under
Chapter 47C), it can be argued that it is technically possible to
create a planned community with horizontal boundaries and
bypass entirely Chapter 47C. 49 This will not occur, however, for
marketability reasons. Comment 2 to the PCA is a message that
what would be condominiums should not be created as planned
communities.5" It is doubtful that a clean title insurance policy
would be issued to the adventuresome developer attempting to
bypass the Condominium Act (Chapter 47C of the General
Statutes).5
development rights, the purchaser's right to cancel, express and implied
warranties, a theory of recovery and attorney's fees for the enforcement of
consumer and related rights, provisions related to the labeling of promotional
material, the declarant's obligation to complete certain improvements, and a
provision related to the substantial completion of units. None of these
protections are applicable at the present time to a planned community. The PCA
as passed by the General Assembly unfortunately omits the all important Article
4, "Protection of Purchasers," the counterpart to the same article in the North
Carolina Condominium Act.
Referring back to the "Prefatory Note" to the Uniform Planned Community
Act, the reporter makes a significant point:
Finally, review of the common-law multi-owner projects persuaded the
Conference that homeowner association developments, in which the
common elements are owned by the association, offer an attractive
alternative to fractionalized ownership, even in buildings containing
units divided by horizontal boundaries. Accordingly, the Act has been
drafted in a way which would permit the common elements to be owned
by the association, even in a high rise building.
49. The term "condominium" is defined at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(7) as
meaning ". . .real estate, as defined and created under Chapter 47C [of the
General Statutes]."
50. North Carolina Comment 2 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-101 (1999).
51. There is unfortunately a legitimate way to bypass most of the consumer
protections of the condominium act. A condominium regime can be made a part
of the planned community under the PCA. Therefore, while buildings with
horizontal boundaries must be created in the condominium format, all
surrounding land and amenities can be part of a PCA.
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There is a large category of developments that are clearly not
planned communities nor can they opt to be planned communities
under the PCA in their present form. These are subdivisions
where lot owners are not legally obligated, by virtue of their own-
ership of a lot, to pay taxes or expenses or assessments for com-
mon areas.
Example. Creek-Acre is a subdivision in North Carolina subject to
numerous restrictive and protective covenants. The subdivision
has no common areas, parks, or private roads and no covenant by
which the lot owners promise to support in any way the upkeep of
common areas. The subdivision does have a homeowners associa-
tion that plans such important events as block parties and the
annual golf tournament and dinner-dance. Creek-Acre is not a
"planned community" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(23)
regardless of the date it came into legal existence. It is not subject
to the PCA and the lot owners cannot opt in to coverage of the PCA
absent some major alteration of the nature of the development.
Example. Victorian Gardens is a sixty-lot subdivision created in
1890 in a major North Carolina city. The original covenants
required each lot owner to pay $5.00 per annum for maintenance
of a small garden and fountain located at a corner lot in the subdi-
vision. There has never been a homeowners' association, and
inflation long ago rendered the $5.00 assessment meaningless.
Indeed, assessments have not been collected since 1915. Victorian
Gardens is not a "planned community" as defined by the PCA. By
virtue of the doctrines of acquiescence and waiver, the lot owners
are no longer "expressly obligated" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-
103(23) to make any payment for maintenance of the garden and
fountain. 52 It is not subject to the PCA and the lot owners cannot
opt in to coverage absent some major alteration of the nature of
the development.
On the other hand, very basic real estate developments
clearly qualify even though they do not exhibit many of the attrib-
utes of the typical planned community.
Example. Moccasin-Acre is a subdivision of 21 lots located on each
side of a private, unpaved road. The subdivision has no common
areas or parks, and no restrictive covenants except for one well-
drafted affirmative assessment covenant requiring each lot owner
to contribute $35.00/year for maintenance and grading of the road.
Moccasin-Acre is a "planned community" for purposes of the PCA.
52. See JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE IN NORTH CAROLINA
§18-7 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 1994).
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It clearly fits the definition in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(23). 5 3
Even if created prior to the January 1, 1999 effective date of the
PCA, it is subject to numerous provisions of the new Act. Also, by
following statutory procedures, its residents can, if they desire opt
in for full coverage. If created on or after January 1, 1999, it is
subject to full coverage by the Act.
C. Pre-January 1, 1999 Planned Communities
What is the applicability of the PCA to planned communities
created prior to the January 1, 1999 effective date of the Act? It is
twofold. As alluded to above, significant portions of the Act auto-
matically apply to pre-1999 planned communities. There is also a
provision enabling pre-1999 planned communities to opt in for full
coverage under the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(d) entitled,
"Applicability," provides as follows:
(d) Any planned community created prior to the effective date of
this Chapter may elect to make the provisions of this Chapter
applicable to it by amending its declaration to provide that this
Chapter shall apply to that planned community. The amendment
may be made by affirmative vote or written agreement signed by
lot owners of lots to which at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of the
votes in the association are allocated or any smaller majority the
declaration specifies. To the extent the procedures and require-
ments for amendment in the declaration conflict with the provi-
sions of this subsection, this subsection shall control with respect
to any amendment to provide that this Chapter applies to that
planned community.
As the above statute indicates, a planned community created
prior to January 1, 1999 can opt in and make the entire PCA
applicable to it by following the procedures described. Signifi-
cantly, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47F-3-115 to -116,
with one exception, 54 apply to planned communities created prior
53. The author of this manuscript lives in a very unusual but perhaps not
unique development. This development has a golf course, private roads, and
some common areas. Yet there is absolutely no obligation legally imposed on any
lot owner to contribute for the maintenance and upkeep of these areas. While
the development is subject to numerous restrictive and protective covenants, it is
not a "planned community" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103 (23). Therefore, it
is not subject to any part of the PCA.
54. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(e) is applicable to actions arising on or after
the January 1, 1999 effective date. It provides for costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees for a prevailing party in a judgment, decree or order in any action
brought under this section.
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to January 1, 1999 whether or not they opt in to coverage by the
entire PCA. Thus, Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc. ,55 and the other
North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions dealing with affirma-
tive assessment covenants are altered to the extent that a planned
community covered by the PCA is involved. The authority for the
common assessment becomes a statutory one, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-3-115. The lien for enforcement of the assessments also
becomes a statutory one, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116. The murky
waters of covenants running with the land and special rules appli-
cable to affirmative covenants can be henceforth bypassed by
using this statutory authority to both authorize and enforce
assessments.
Those existing planned communities with a few recalcitrant
homeowners who, protected by the narrow rules of the law of cove-
nants and equitable restrictions, have stood in the way of
improvement and progress, will definitely want to consider opting
in for full coverage under the PCA. The 67% vote required to
achieve this goal is a high enough percentage to assure that a rea-
sonably democratic process will take place concerning the decision
to opt in to the Act. A few members of a large subdivision/planned
community created prior to 1999 should not be able to continue to
exercise in effect a de facto veto power over changes and improve-
ments sought for the good of the entire community. The PCA will
facilitate those changes once the planned community duly opts in.
D. Additional Observations on the "Definitions" Section
In addition to the definition of "planned community" dis-
cussed above, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103 contains over two
dozen other definitions that attorneys dealing with planned com-
munities will want to carefully analyze. The definitions parallel
in many ways those located in both the North Carolina Condomin-
ium Act and the Uniform Planned Community Act. As noted
above, since a legislative decision was made to exclude condomini-
ums from coverage under the PCA, it will of course vary in termi-
nology and statutory language from both the Condominium Act
and Uniform Act. The PCA, for example, deals with "lot" own-
ers;56 the Condominium Act and Uniform Act each deal with
"unit" owners.5 7 Language in the Uniform Planned Community
55. 119 N.C. App. 761, 460 S.E.2d 197 (1995).
56. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(20).
57. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-103(26); U.P.C.A. § 1-103(28) (1980).
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Act directed toward the condominium form of ownership has
appropriately been eliminated from the PCA,5s and, by its nature,
the Condominium Act will vary in terminology for the same
reason.
It is misleading, however, to conclude that the only deviations
of the PCA from the Uniform and Condominium Acts in both the
definitions section and elsewhere are based on the elimination of
condominium-related provisions from the purview of Chapter 47F
of the North Carolina General Statutes. As will be explained in
numerous places in this article, other substantive deviations occur
that reflect major policy decisions unrelated to the noncoverage of
condominiums by the PCA. The main category of these other dele-
tions and alterations is the area of consumer rights. Definitions
related to Article 4 of the UPCA, "Protection Of Purchasers," an
article not included in the PCA, are, of course, eliminated. UPCA
§ 1-103(19), the definition of "offering," therefore becomes mean-
ingless and is not included in the PCA.5 9
The PCA contains a sweeping definition of "reasonable attor-
neys' fees" that has no counterpart in the Uniform or Condomin-
ium Acts.60 That term is defined as meaning "attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred without regard to any limitations on attor-
neys' fees which otherwise may be allowed by law."61
E. Variation of the Provisions of the PCA
The statutory section titled "Variation"6 2 can be a bit mislead-
ing if taken at face value. In subsection (a), it provides: "Except as
specifically provided in specific sections of this Chapter, the provi-
sions of this chapter may not be varied by the declaration or
bylaws." To be sure, there are many central statutory provisions
58. As will be expressed in Part IV of this article, the author advocates a
repeal of the North Carolina Condominium Act, the adoption of one
comprehensive Planned Community Act applicable to all forms of planned
communities, including the condominium form, and a return of consumer
protection provisions to the Planned Community Act.
59. Since the North Carolina Condominium Act does include a "Protection of
Purchasers" article, Article IV, it includes the definition of "offering" at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-1-103(18).
60. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(26).
61. Id. See Sellers supra note 8, at II-IV ("There can now be now doubt that
attorneys fee awards are not subject to limitations or caps imposed by law in
other circumstances, including N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2, as has sometimes been
suggested.") See also Declaration Limits on Attorneys' Fees, infra at Part III. Z.
62. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-104.
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that can not be varied by the declaration or bylaws; however,
there are also numerous instances throughout the act where the
declaration or bylaws can alter significant provisions of the PCA.
The following summary demonstrates the flexibility accorded the
drafter of planned community governing documents.
INSTANCES WHERE DECLARATION OR BYLAWS CAN
ALTER OR AFFECT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102
Applicability
Subsection (b)(1) - The PCA is not applicable to a residential
development of less than 20 lots unless the declaration provides
otherwise.
Subsection (b)(2) - A nonresidential planned community is not
subject to the PCA unless the declaration provides otherwise.
Subsection (d) - The declaration of a pre-1999 planned community
can call for a smaller majority than 67% to opt in for full coverage
under the PCA.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-1-107
Eminent Domain
Subsection (b) - Allocated interests of a lot can be reduced other-
wise than in proportion to reduction in size if the declaration spec-
ifies another basis.
Subsection (d) - Where limited common elements are taken by
eminent domain, the declaration can provide for an apportionment
of the award other than that which is specified by statute.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-2-117
Amendment of Declaration
Subsection (a) - The terms of the declaration can provide for
amendments by the declarant. The declaration can call for a
majority higher than 67% to amend a declaration. Where all lots
are nonresidential, a declaration can call for a majority of less
than 67%.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-2-118
Termination of Planned Community.
Subsection (a) - The Statutory figure of 80% to terminate can be
increased by the declaration. Where all lots are nonresidential, a
declaration can call for a percentage lower than 80% to terminate.
Subsection (b) - If the declaration as originally recorded so pro-
vides, a termination agreement can provide for the sale of lots in
addition to the common elements.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-103
Executive Board Members and Officers.
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Subsection (a) 1 The executive board can act in all instances on
behalf of the association unless the declaration (or bylaws) provide
otherwise.
Subsection (d) - Declaration can call for a period of declarant con-
trol during which the declarant can appoint and remove executive
board members and officers.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-107
Upkeep of planned community; responsibility and assessments for
damages.
Subsection (a) - "Except as otherwise provided in the declaration"
the association is responsible for the common elements and each
lot owner is responsible for his or her lot and improvements
thereon.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-107.1
Procedures for fines and suspension of planned community privi-
leges or services.
The declaration can specify a different procedure for the imposi-
tion of fines or suspension of planned community privileges or
services.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-108
Meetings.
Special meetings of the association can be called by lot owners
having 10% of the votes or any lower percentage specified by the
bylaws.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-109
Quorums.
Subsection (a) - A statutory 10% quorum can be altered by the
bylaws.
Subsection (b) - The bylaws can alter the requirements of a quo-
rum deemed present throughout the meeting.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-110
Voting; proxies.
The declaration can alter a number of statutory rules with regard
to voting and proxies.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-112
Conveyance or encumbrance of common elements.
Subsection (a) - The 80% requirement for a vote to convey common
elements may be raised higher by the declaration.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-113
Insurance.
Subsection (b) - The declaration may require the association to
carry other insurance besides that required by statute.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-114
[Vol. 22:1
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/2
PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT
Surplus funds.
The declaration can alter the payment of surplus funds of the
association.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-115
Assessments for common expenses.
Subsection (a) - Except as otherwise provided in the declaration,
until the association makes a common expense assessment, the
declarant is responsible for the payment of all common expenses.
Subsection (b) - Subject to certain statutory sections, the declara-
tion sets standards for the allocations for common assessments.
In pre-1999 planned communities, the declaration must provide
for interest charges.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-120
Declaration limits on attorneys' fees.
Court may award reasonable attorneys' fees in certain actions
only if allowed in the declaration.
The above list of instances where the terms of the PCA can be
varied represents an understandable policy decision by the draft-
ers of the Uniform Act "to provide great flexibility in the creation
of planned communities."6 3 Attorneys drafting the declaration
and bylaws for a North Carolina planned community will want to
become familiar with those areas where the unique requirements
of the planned community may dictate a need to deviate from stat-
utory norms.
To avoid evading the statutory requirements by another
method, the PCA, like the Condominium Act,64 prohibits varying
the provisions of the Act by agreement.65 The declarant is also
prohibited from utilizing devices such as powers of attorney or
proxies to evade the requirements of the PCA.6 6 These provisions
constitute valuable consumer protections.
F. Applicability of Local Ordinances, Regulations and Building
Codes
The PCA contains a protection of planned communities from
discrimination by local authorities in the areas of zoning, subdivi-
sion regulations, building code provisions or other land use laws,
63. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 1-104 (1980).
64. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-104(b).
65. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-104(b). This subsection adds: "however, after
breach of a provision of this Chapter, rights created hereunder may be knowingly
waived in writing."
66. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-104(c).
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ordinances or regulations.6 7 Other than this nondiscrimination
mandate, the Act does not affect land use laws and regulations.6"
G. Eminent Domain
Although they will probably be rare events, the PCA deals
with the necessary topic of various eminent domain scenarios.69
These scenarios include the taking of all or part of a lot with a
remnant that is not useable,70 the reallocation of interests,71 the
payment of awards and reduction of allocated interests,72 a
requirement that the association promptly prepare, execute and
record an amendment reflecting reallocations,73 the payment of
awards for the taking of common areas, 4 and the recordation of
the court decree of eminent domain. 75 For additional guidance on
eminent domain issues, help can be located at the Official Com-
ment to the corresponding eminent domain provisions in the
North Carolina Condominium Act.76 Those comments include
four examples of how eminent domain will affect a condominium.
They are equally helpful in the planned community context.
H. Supplemental Principles of Law Applicable
The final statutory section in Article 1 of the PCA, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-1-108, reads:
The principles of law and equity as well as other North Carolina
statutes (including the provisions of the North Carolina Nonprofit
Corporation Act) supplement the provisions of this Chapter,
except to the extent inconsistent with this Chapter. When these
67. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-106.
68. Id.
69. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107. This section is organized with slight
variation from the corresponding section in the North Carolina Condominium
Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-107 and U.P.C.A. § 1-107 (1980), but the language is
substantially the same.
70. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107(a).
71. Id.
72. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107(b).
73. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107(c).
74. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107(d).
75. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107(e).
76. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-107. The Official Comment is almost identical to
that following U.P.C.A. § 1-107.
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principles or statutes are inconsistent or conflict with this Chap-
ter, the provisions of this Chapter will control.7 7
From the perspective of consumer protection, one cannot help
but think of the potential impact of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1,
declaring unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."78 Clearly, no draftsmanship, practice or pro-
cedure that complies with the PCA can constitute an unfair or
deceptive trade practice. On the other hand, improper sales prac-
tices, the misapplication of association rules and regulations,
unfair dealings and activities by the declarant, and arbitrary deci-
sions or actions by the homeowners' association have the potential
of triggering an unfair or deceptive trade practices action.
I. UPCA Article 1 Provisions Not Included In PCA
A number of sections from Article 1 of the UPCA - some sub-
stantive, some simply providing clarification - are not included in
the PCA.79 A lack of any helpful and official legislative history on
these omissions is disappointing. The sections in question are
also not included in the Uniform Condominium Act, and that is
perhaps the best logic and reasoning to be found.
One of these eliminated provisions, UPCA § 1-112, authorizes
a court to refuse to enforce a contract or limit the application of a
clause in a contract where the court finds as a matter of law that
the contract or clause was unconscionable at the time the contract
was made. According to the Official Comment to this UPCA provi-
sion, this language is similar to both Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and Section 1-311 of the Uniform Land Transac-
tions Act.80 The inclusion of this section in the PCA would have
helped to establish a favorable legal climate for effective consumer
protection.
Another blow to consumer protection is the elimination of
UPCA § 1-112 (Obligation of Good Faith) which simply reads:
77. This section is identical to the corresponding section of the North Carolina
Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-108 (1987). It is a simpler, perhaps
clearer version of the original provision in U.P.C.A. § 1-108.
78. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1994).
79. Those sections not included are U.P.C.A. § 1-109 (Construction Against
Implicit Repeal), § 1-110 (Uniformity of Application and Construction), § 1-111
(Severability), § 1-112 (Unconscionable Agreement or Term of Contract), § 1-113
(Obligation of Good Faith), § 1-114 (Remedies to be Liberally Administered), and
§ 1-115 (Adjustment of Dollar Amounts).
80. Comment to U.P.C.A. § 1-112.
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"Every contract or duty governed by this Act imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Perhaps it is
the comment to this UPCA section that caused some consterna-
tion. It reads:
This section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this
Act: in planned community transactions, good faith is required by
the performance and enforcement of all agreements and duties.
Good faith, as used in this Act, means observance of two stan-
dards, "honesty in fact" and observance of reasonable standards of
fair dealing. While the term is not defined, the term is derived
from and used in the same manner as in Section 1-201 of the Uni-
form Simplification of Land Transfers Act and Sections 2-103(I)(b)
and 7-404 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 1
Yet another setback for the cause of consumer protection can
be found in the failure to include UPCA § 1-114 ("Remedies To Be
Liberally Administered") in the PCA. The key provision reads:
"The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party is put in as good a position as
if the other party had fully performed." The provision is hardly
radical, especially in light of the final sentence of the section
which eliminates the awarding of "consequential, special, or puni-
tive damages" unless they are specifically provided in the UPCA
or by other rule of law.
III. ARTICLE 2 OF THE PCA - "CREATION, ALTERATION, AND
TERMINATION OF PLANNED COMMUNITIES"
A. Contents of Article 2
Article 2 contains the statutory guidance for the creation of a
planned community,8 2 the construction and validity of the decla-
ration and bylaws 8 3 amendments to the declaration, 4 termina-
tion of the planned community,85 the creation of master
associations, 6 and the merger or consolidation of planned
communities.87
81. Comment to U.P.C.A. § 1-113.
82. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-101 (1999).
83. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-103 (1999).
84. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-117 (1999).
85. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118 (1999).
86. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-120 (1999).
87. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121 (1999).
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B. Provisions in the UPCA Omitted from the PCA
Numerous provisions from Article 2 of the UPCA were not
included in the North Carolina PCA. A detailed description of
unit boundaries, for example, set forth at UPCA § 2-102, is not
included in the PCA.ss While this UPCA section could be applica-
ble to condominium units, it also serves as a helpful guide con-
cerning which parts of the planned community are individual
units and which parts constitute the common elements. Because
of its absence from the PCA, drafters of the declaration should
take special care in precisely defining unit boundaries in
townhouse or other common wall developments. Perhaps UPCA
§ 2-102 can serve as a starting point for drafting purposes in spite
of its exclusion from the North Carolina version.
UPCA §§ 2-104 through 2-116 are also not included in the
PCA. The exclusion of many of these UPCA provisions is puz-
zling, unfortunate and in some instances a serious setback for the
rights of the consumer. UPCA § 2-104, for example, clarifies what
a legally sufficient description of a unit should be.s 9 Perhaps the
88. U.P.C.A. § 2-102 [Unit Boundaries] reads as follows:
Except as provided by the declaration:
(1) If walls, floors, or ceilings of a unit are designated as the boundaries
of that unit, all lath, furring, wallboard, plasterboard, plaster, paneling,
tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring, and any other materials
constituting any part of the finished survaces thereof are a part of the
unit, and all other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of
the common elements.
(2) If any chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit, bearing wall, bearing collumn,
or any other fixture lies partially within and partially outside the
designated boundaries of a unit, any portion thereof serving only that
unit is a limited common element allocated solely to that unit, and any
portion thereof serving more than one unit or any portion of the common
elements is a part of the common elements.
(3) Subject to the provision of paragraph (2), all spaces, interior
partitions, and other fixtures and improvements within the boundaries
of a unit are a part of the unit.
(4) Any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches,
balconies, patios, and all exterior doors and windows or other fixtures
designated to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit's
boundaries, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to that
unit.
89. U.P.C.A. § 2-104 reads:
A description of a unit which sets forth the name of the planned
community, the [recording data] for the declaration, the [county] in
which the planned community is located, and the identifying number of
the unit, is a sufficient legal description of that unit and all rights,
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drafters were concerned that the term "unit" would constitute a
confusing reference to a condominium unit, but it could just as
well be referring to a non-condominium townhouse or planned
unit development.
Another important and helpful UPCA provision, "Contents of
Declaration,"9° is also not included in the PCA. Once again, valu-
able consumer rights were sacrificed when this provision was jet-
tisoned from the North Carolina version of the Act. In addition to
obvious information that a well drafted declaration would contain
in any event,9 ' the UPCA requirements for the declaration also
include the following consumer oriented information: a statement
of the maximum number of units which the declarant reserves the
right to create,92 a description of any real estate which is or must
become common elements and limited common elements,9 3 a
description of any real estate which may be allocated subse-
quently as limited common elements,94 a description of any devel-
opment rights and other special declarant rights reserved by the
declarant,9 5 other disclosures concerning development rights,96
and any restrictions on use, occupancy, and alienation of the
units.97 After listing these and other requirements for the con-
tents of a declaration, the UPCA then adds that "[t]he declaration
may contain any other matters the declarant deems
appropriate."98
obligations, and interests appurtenant to that unit which were created
by the declaration and bylaws.
90. U.P.C.A. § 2-105.
91. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(a)(1) - (3) reads as follows:
(a) The declaration for a planned community must contain:
(1) the names of the planned community and association;
(2) the name of every [county] in which any part of the planned
community is situated;
(3) a legally sufficient description of the real estate included in the
planned community;
92. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(4).
93. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(6), which reads in full: "a description of any real estate
which is or must become common elements and limited common elements, other
than those specified in Section 2-102(2) and (4), as provided in Section 2-
109(b)(10) [of the U.P.C.A.]."
94. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(7).
95. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(8).
96. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(9) and (10).
97. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(12).
98. U.P.C.A. § 2-105(b).
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Significantly, the downsized PCA contains absolutely no
requirement that a developer of a planned community make
meaningful consumer disclosures in the declaration, in a public
offering statement, or in any materials advertising and promoting
the project. In this regard, it varies significantly from both the
UPCA and the North Carolina Condominium Act. The one-sided
nature of the final version of the PCA calls into question the prov-
erb that a half a loaf is better than none, especially when the half
that was enacted will be on the table of the developer/declarant
and not the consumer.9 9
Other major portions of Article 2 of the UPCA were also omit-
ted from Article 2 of the PCA. Omitted sections include UPCA § 2-
106 [Leasehold Planned Communities], UPCA § 2-107 [Allocation
of Votes and Common Expense Liabilities], UPCA § 2-108 [Lim-
ited Common Elements], UPCA § 2-109 [Plats and Plans], 100
UPCA § 2-110 [Exercise of Development Rights], 10' UPCA § 2-111
[Alteration of Units], UPCA § 2-112 [Relocation of Boundaries
Between Units], UPCA § 2-113 [Subdivision of Units], UPCA 2-
114 [Easement for Encroachments] or, in the alternative [Monu-
ments as Boundaries], UPCA § 2-115 [Use for Sales Purposes],
and UPCA § 2-116 [Easement Rights].
C. Resolution of Conflicts Between Declaration and Bylaws/
Marketability of Lots
The PCA contains a useful legal housekeeping provision
resolving conflicts between the provisions of the declaration and
bylaws °2 and providing assurances regarding marketability. 1 3
99. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-108, "Supplemental general principles of law
applicable," does make it possible to utilize N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, the Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act when appropriate.
100. One of the many requirements for a plat that would benefit consumers is
found at U.P.C.A. § 2-109(c), which reads: "A plat may also show the intended
location and dimensions of any contemplated improvement to be constructed
anywhere within the planned community. Any contemplated improvement
shown must be labeled either "MUST BE BUILT" or "NEED NOT BE BUILT."
101. U.P.C.A. Comment 1 to this section reads:
This section generally describes the method by which any development
right may be exercised. Importantly, while new development rights may
be reserved within new real estate which is added to the planned
community, the original time limits on the exercise of these rights which
the declarant must include in the original declaration may not be
extended. Thus, the development process may continue only within the
self-determined constraints originally described by the declarant.
102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-103(c).
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In the event of a conflict between declaration and bylaws, the dec-
laration prevails except to the extent that the declaration is incon-
sistent with the PCA. 10 4  An "insubstantial failure" of the
declaration to comply with the PCA does not render title to a lot
and common elements unmarketable.' 0 5 To be sure, the clear
guidelines that the PCA provides for planned communities should
have the effect of enhancing marketability.
D. Procedures for Amendment of Declaration
The comment to the amendment section of the UPCA notes
that the amendment section "recognizes that the declaration, as
the perpetual governing instrument for the planned community,
may be amended by various parties at various times in the life of
the project.""°6 Sophisticated real property attorneys do not need
statutory guidelines with regard to the amendment of the planned
community declaration because they will have drafted amend-
ment procedures with precision. Unfortunately, not all documen-
tation is drafted by knowledgeable and experienced practitioners,
and a statutory procedure for amendment is therefore a wise addi-
tion to the PCA. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-117(a) provides the cen-
tral guidelines on amendment as follows:
Except in cases of amendments that may be executed by a declar-
ant under the terms of the declaration or by certain lot owners
under N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-2-118(b), the declaration may be
amended only by the affirmative vote or written agreement signed
by lot owners of lots to which at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of
the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger majority
the declaration specifies or by the declarant if necessary for the
exercise of any development right. The declaration may specify a
smaller number only if all of the lots are restricted exclusively to
nonresidential use.
103. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-103(d).
104. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-103(c).
105. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-103(d). This subsection adds: "Whether a
substantial failure to comply with this Chapter impairs marketability shall be
determined by the law of this State related to marketability." N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-2-103(b) also cures any potential challenges under the rule against
perpetuities.
106. U.P.C.A. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 2-117 [Amendment of Declaration], a
section of the U.P.C.A. that is substantially identical to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-
117 except for the omission of subsection (d) of the U.P.C.A. provisions related to
amendment.
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Significantly, another statutory subsection adds that "[n]o
action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted pursu-
ant to this section may be brought more than one year after the
amendment is recorded."10 7 This statute of limitations is an
appropriate way to encourage flexibility through amendments and
assure stability if proper procedures are followed and the one year
passes. Amendments must also be properly recorded.10 8
The PCA provisions related to amendment differ from the
UPCA in one important respect. Subsection (d) of the UPCA was
eliminated from the North Carolina PCA. Once again, the omis-
sion is one related to consumer protection. UPCA § 2-117(d)
reads:
Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other pro-
visions of this Act, no amendment may create or increase the spe-
cial declarant rights, increase the number of units, change the
boundaries of any unit, the allocated interests of a unit, or the
uses to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous
consent of the unit owners.
E. Termination of Planned Communities
The official comment to the UPCA section on the termination
of a planned community explains the need for a thorough termina-
tion procedure as follows:
While few planned communities have yet been terminated under
present state law, a number of problems are certain to arise upon
termination which have not been adequately addressed by most of
those statutes. These include such matters as the percentage of
unit owners which should be required for termination; the time
frame within which written consents from all unit owners must be
secured; the manner in which common elements and units should
be disposed of following termination, both in the case of sale and
non-sale of all of the real estate; the circumstances under which
sale of units may be imposed on dissenting owners; the powers
held by the board of directors on behalf of the association to nego-
tiate a sales agreement; the practical consequences to the project
from the time the unit owners approve the termination until the
transfer of title and occupancy actually occurs; the impact of ter-
mination on liens on the units and common elements; distribution
of sales proceeds; the effect of foreclosure or enforcement of liens
107. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-117(b).
108. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-117(c), (e).
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against the entire planned community with respect to the validity
of the project; and other matters. 10 9
By following the termination provisions of the UPCA, the
PCA therefore appropriately looks ahead to the day when some
planned communities will need to be terminated. It sets forth
helpful and clear guidelines for termination. 110 A planned com-
munity can be terminated "only by agreement of lot owners of lots
to which at least eighty percent (80%) of the votes in the associa-
tion are allocated, or any larger percentage the declaration speci-
fies."' 1 ' A smaller percentage can be specified in the declaration if
all of the lots in the planned community are restricted exclusively
to nonresidential uses." 2 Under the UPCA, lenders have a right
to require that the declaration specify a higher percentage of unit
owner consent or require the consent of a percentage of the lend-
ers." 3 Without explanation, these provisions are not included in
the PCA." 4
As with the original declaration, an agreement to terminate a
planned community must be properly executed in the same man-
ner as a deed. 1 5 It may provide for the sale of the common ele-
ments, but it may not require the sale of lots following
termination without the consent of all of the lot owners or unless
the declaration as originally recorded provided otherwise."'
109. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 2-118(a).
110. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118. The effect of eminent domain on a planned
community is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-107.
111. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(a), a subsection that is identical to U.P.C.A.
§ 2-118(a).
112. Id.
113. U.P.C.A. § 2-119 [Rights of Secured Lenders]. U.P.C.A. Comment 2 to
U.P.C.A. § 2-118.
114. There is no detailed legislative history of the PCA. It is clear that some
special interest groups objected to numerous parts of the U.P.C.A., and many of
these parts were omitted. Official explanations for each omission are not
available.
115. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(b), which provides:
An agreement to terminate shall be evidenced by the execution of a
termination agreement, or ratifications thereof, in the same manner as a
deed, by the requisite number of lot owners. The termination agreement
shall specify a date after which the agreement will be void unless it is
recorded before that date. A termination agreement and all ratifications
thereof shall be recorded in every county in which a portion of the
planned community is situated and is effective only upon recordation.
The language of U.P.C.A. § 2-118(b) is identical.
116. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(c). This provision is substantially the same
as U.P.C.A. § 2-118(d). U.P.C.A § 2-118(c), dealing with planned communities
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Like the UPCA,11 7 the PCA provides that the association may
contract for the sale of real estate in the planned community on
behalf of the lot owners. 118 Any such contract is not binding until
approved pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-2-118."19 Title to planned community real estate constitut-
ing common elements that is not to be sold following termination
"vests in the lot owners upon termination as tenants in common in
proportion to their respective interests as provided in the termina-
tion agreement."
20
Treatment of proceeds of any real estate sale following termi-
nation of the planned community is set forth at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-2-118(f). That subsection provides these guidelines:
Following termination of the planned community, the proceeds of
any sale of real estate, together with the assets of the association,
are held by the association as trustee for lot owners and holders of
liens on the lots as their interests may appear. All other creditors
of the association are to be treated as if they had perfected liens on
the common elements immediately before termination. 12 1
containing only horizontal boundaries, has been omitted from the PCA. For a
recent case from another jurisdiction involving the termination of a
condominium and a dispute over earthquake insurance proceeds, see Foothill
Village Homeowners Assoc. v. Bishop, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195 (1999).
117. U.P.C.A. § 2-118(e).
118. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(d).
119. Id. This statutory subsection adds several additional clarifications: "Until
the sale has been concluded and the proceeds thereof distributed, the association
continues in existence with all powers it had before termination. Proceeds of the
sale shall be distributed to lot owners and lienholders as their interests may
appear, as provided in the termination agreement." The following language from
U.P.C.A. § 2-118(e) was not included in the counterpart PCA subsection: "If any
real estate in the planned community is to be sold following termination, title to
that real estate, upon termination, vests in the association as trustee for the
holders of all interests in the units. Thereafter, the association has all powers
necessary and appropriate to effect the sale."
120. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(e). This provision differs from the
counterpart subsection, U.P.C.A. § 2-118(f). Part of the difference is due to the
coverage of condominiums by the U.P.C.A. but not by the PCA.
121. This subsection is substantially the same as U.P.C.A. § 2-118(g). N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(g) adds:
If the termination agreement does not provide for the distribution of
sales proceeds pursuant to subsection (d) of this section or the vesting of
title pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, sales proceeds shall be
distributed and title shall vest in accordance with each lot owner's
allocated share of common expense liability.
Comment 8, explaining U.P.C.A. § 2-118(g) summarizes the need for
sections dealing with creditors rights as follows:
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F. Effect of Foreclosure
In the event of a foreclosure of a deed of trust or other lien or
encumbrance against the common elements of a planned commu-
nity, that planned community is not automatically terminated,
although a mortgagee or lienholder who puts together a sufficient
number of votes through the acquisition of units can institute ter-
mination proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-
118(a).122 In the event of foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or
encumbrance against withdrawable real estate, that action "does
not of itself withdraw that real estate from the planned commu-
nity, but the person taking title thereto has the right to require
from the association, upon request, an amendment excluding the
real estate from the planned community."' 23
G. Master Associations
The UPCA introductory comment dealing with master
associations 124 notes that in large or multi-phased planned com-
munities it is common for the declarant to create a master or
umbrella association to provide management services or decision-
A complex series of creditors' rights questions may arise upon
termination. Those questions involve competing claims of first
mortgage holders on individual units, other secured and unsecured
creditors of individual unit owners, judgment creditors of the association
to whom a security interest in the common elements has been granted,
and unsecured creditors of the association. Subsection (g) [the
counterpart of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(f)] attempts to establish
general rules with respect to these competing claims, but leaves to state
law the resolution of the priorities of those competing claims.
Comment 8 also contains a series of detailed examples explaining the
relationship of the U.P.C.A. to state lien priority rules. These examples should
be studied in the event a priorities fact situation arises under the PCA.
122. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(h). This is the case except as provided in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(i). That subsection provides:
If a lien or encumbrance against a portion of the real estate comprising
the planned community has priority over the declaration and the lien or
encumbrance has not been partially released, the parties foreclosing the
lien or encumbrance may, upon foreclosure, record an instrument
excluding the real estate subject to that lien or encumbrance from the
planned community.
An official comment to this subsection of the PCA reads: "Rights under
subsection (i) are lost upon the partial release of any lien or
encumbrance by its holder. Subsection (i) is consistent with the
Uniform Planned Community Act."
123. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118(h).
124. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 2-120.
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making functions for a series of smaller projects. 125 The comment
then adds: "This section addresses a number of issues frequently
overlooked in such a structure."126 The PCA, however, does not
address all of the issues covered by the UPCA. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-2-120 simply provides:
If the declaration for a planned community provides that any of
the powers described in G.S. 47F-3-102 are to be exercised by or
may be delegated to a profit or nonprofit corporation which exer-
cises those or other powers on behalf of one or more other planned
communities or for the benefit of the lot owners of one or more
other planned communities, all provisions of this act applicable to
lot owners' associations apply to any such corporation. 127
H. Merger or Consolidation of Planned Communities
The PCA accommodates the possibility that two or more
planned communities may find it attractive to merge into a single
planned community. Its provisions on merger or consolidation are
almost identical to the UPCA counterpart language 12s and deal
with issues of authorization, execution and reallocation of inter-
ests.129 As discussed above,1 30 another option to merger or consol-
idation is to create a master association.
The authorization subsection of the statute provides that any
two or more planned communities can merge or consolidate into a
single planned community by agreement of the lot owners and
compliance with applicable PCA procedural requirements.1 3 1 Pro-
cedural requirements for merger are the same as those for termi-
nation of a planned community. 132 A merger or consolidation
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-120. This statute is substantially the same as
U.P.C.A. § 2-120(a). Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the U.P.C.A. have not
been carried over to the PCA. Thus, once again, the PCA provision is a
significantly downsized version of the U.P.C.A. counterpart provision.
128. U.P.C.A. § 2-121 [Merger or consolidation of planned communities].
129. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121.
130. See supra Part III. G.
131. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121(a).
132. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121(b). This subsection sets forth the details of
execution of the merger or consolidation agreement as follows:
An agreement of two or more planned communities to merge or
consolidate pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be evidenced
by an agreement prepared, executed, recorded, and certified by the
president of the association of each of the preexisting planned
communities following approval by owners of lots to which are allocated
1999]
35
Hetrick: Of "Private Governments" and the Regulation of Neighborhoods: The
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
agreement must "provide for the reallocation of the allocated
interests in the new association among the lots of the resultant
planned community."1 33 Two statutory options for reallocation
are identified: the merger or consolidation agreement can state
the reallocations or the formulas upon which they are based; or, it
can reallocate,
[B]y stating the percentage of overall common expense liabilities
and votes in the new association which are allocated to all of the
lots comprising each of the preexisting planned communities, and
providing that the portion of the percentages allocated to each lot
formerly comprising a part of the preexisting planned community
shall be equal to the percentages of common expense liabilities
and votes in the association allocated to that lot by the declaration
of the preexisting planned community.13 4
The merged or consolidated planned community becomes the
legal successor of the pre-existing planned communities, "and the
operations and activities of all associations or the pre-existing
planned communities shall be merged or consolidated into a single
association which shall hold all powers, rights, obligations, assets,
and liabilities of all preexisting associations."1 35
IV. ARTICLE 3 OF THE PCA - "MANAGEMENT OF
PLANNED COMMUNITY"
A. Different Perspectives on the Power of the Association
In an excellent summary of the highlights of the new PCA,
Article 3, "Management of Planned Community," is hailed by one
expert as "good news for all planned communities." 36 Article 3 is
described as addressing "some of the greatest needs and most vex-
ing problems surrounding the day to day administration and gov-
ernance of planned communities."' 37 The introduction to Article 3
continues:
the percentage of votes in each planned community required to
terminate that planned community. Any such agreement shall be
recorded in every county in which a portion of the planned community is
located and is not effective until recorded.
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121(c).
134. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121(c). There are helpful examples set forth at
U.P.C.A. Comment 3 to U.P.C.A. § 2-121.
135. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-121(a).
136. Timothy G. Sellers, North Carolina Planned Community Act "Better Late
Than Never, 20 Real Property 9 (May 1999). (Real Property is the Newsletter of
the North Carolina Bar Association's Real Property Law Section.)
137. Id.
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[Wihile planned communities are usually created by capable pro-
fessionals, the associations charged with their management are
typically administered by elected boards made up of concerned
and caring neighbors whose experience and capabilities are as
varied as the communities they represent.
These dedicated souls, who almost always serve as volun-
teers, are expected to run the association with the formality of
General Motors while dealing with individual members who are
frequently demanding and sometimes belligerent. In Article 3,
those boards will find many of the "tools" they have desperately
needed to effectively do their job. Some are available to all
planned communities; others, only to those created in 1999 and
beyond. 138
It is clear, therefore, that those who sponsored the PCA
desired a strong, clear source of guidelines and authority for the
management of planned communities by the association. 139 Giv-
ing associations powers that "cover the waterfront"140 is viewed as
a positive evolution of North Carolina real property law. To be
sure, the policy decision to provide a strong statutory power base
for planned communities has merit, but a one-sided approach to
this area does not adequately address the possibility of abuses by
planned communities and their associations. Associations are not
always staffed by "concerned and caring neighbors," nor are indi-
vidual lot owners asserting their rights and liberties necessarily
"frequently demanding and belligerent." In a 1997 Real Estate
Law Journal article, another author's description of the power of
the property owners' association (referred to as the "POA") sheds
an entirely different perspective on this area:
Although a POA is a private organization, it practically consti-
tutes a form of government. The rules, financial practices, and
other governing decisions of the POA can be a powerful force for
good or for ill in the lives of its members. The latitude of the POA
power is great, and it affects many aspects of the lifestyle of the
residences. At its extreme the power can affect the types of resi-
dents attracted to the POA. However, this power is subject to lim-
itations. Increasingly, it is an organization that wields a
138. Id.
139. The comments to the U.P.C.A. assume "the need to provide the association
with sufficient powers to exercise its 'governmental' functions as the ruling body
of the planned community." Comment 5 to U.P.C.A. § 3-102.
140. Id.
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substantial degree of power which at times may be subject to
abuse.
14
'
At the risk of belaboring a theme presented throughout this
article, there is much to be said in favor of a strong planned com-
munity governance structure so long as it is counterbalanced with
an effective array of consumer/lot owner rights. The removal of
most of the consumer rights in the final version of the PCA has
unfortunately shifted the balance of power - perhaps excessively -
in favor of the association. An association under the PCA will
truly be "a powerful force for good or ill in the lives of its mem-
bers." If it acts as a force for ill, its members will find themselves
with a very limited number of arrows in their quiver available to
redress grievances and inappropriate or overreaching association
governance.
B. Contents of Article 3
Article 3 contains the requirements for the organization of the
lot owners' association, 14 2 the powers of the association, 14 3 the
powers and duties of the executive board members and officers,14
provisions dealing with the transfer of special declarant rights14 5
and the termination of contracts and leases of the declarant, 146
and requirements for the bylaws of the association. 4 7 Article 3
also contains provisions dealing with the upkeep of the planned
community (including responsibility and assessment for dam-
ages),'14 procedures for fines and the suspension of planned com-
munity privileges or services, 4 9 guidelines on meetings15 0
141. See Gary S. Moore, Notice And Consent To The Financial And Legal
Obligations In Property Owners' Associations, 25 Real Est. L.J. 378 (1997); see
also Stubblefield & Hyatt, supra note 3, at 599 ("A community association is an
automatic, mandatory membership organization. That means that all owners of
property subject to the covenants creating the community association
automatically become members of that association by virtue of taking title to
that property. They must remain citizens of that association subject to its
governing and taxing powers so long as they remain owners.").
142. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101 (1999).
143. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 (1999).
144. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103 (1999).
145. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-104 (1999).
146. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-105 (1999).
147. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-106 (1999).
148. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107 (1999).
149. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1 (1999).
150. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-108 (1999).
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quorums, 15 1 and voting and proxies. 152 In addition, Article 3
addresses tort and contract liability, 153 provisions dealing with
the conveyance or encumbrance of the common elements,'-" provi-
sions related to insurance, 55 rules on the treatment of surplus
funds, 56 guidelines on assessments for common expenses, 57 the
lien for assessments, 158 rules related to the keeping of association
records, 59 a description of the association's role as a trustee,1 60
and a provision dealing with the recovery of attorneys' fees.1 6 1
C. Comparison of Article 3 of the PCA with the UPCA
The General Assembly retained most of Article 3 of the UPCA
intact when they enacted the PCA. One provision was eliminated
because it is covered by the North Carolina Condominium Act and
was deemed inappropriate for the PCA which is not intended to
cover the condominium form of ownership. 162 As provisions of
Article 3 of the PCA are described below, any material deviation
from the UPCA counterpart provision will be noted.
D. Requirements for Organization of Owners' Association
The PCA requires that a lot owners' association be incorpo-
rated no later than the date that the first lot in the planned com-
munity is conveyed. 163 While this prerequisite is only applicable
151. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-109 (1999).
152. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110 (1999).
153. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111 (1999).
154. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112 (1999).
155. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113 (1999).
156. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-114 (1999).
157. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115 (1999).
158. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116 (1999).
159. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-118 (1999).
160. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-119 (1999).
161. N.C. Gen. Stat. §47F-3-120 (1999).
162. U.P.C.A. § 3-117 [Other Liens Affecting Planned Community]. The North
Carolina Comment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-117 [A statutory section
designated as "Reserved for future codification purposes"] explains as follows:
The North Carolina Condominium Act as well as the Uniform Planned
Community Act on which this act [the PCAI is based both are designed
to apply to communities in which title to common elements is vested in
individual owners. Because title to common elements under this act is
vested in the association, no provision similar to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-
3-117 or Section 3-117 of the Uniform Act has been included.
163. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 3-101 explains the
requirement as follows:
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to planned communities created on or after the January 1, 1999
effective date,' it is elementary that pre-1999 planned communi-
ties must have an appropriate homeowners' association in place in
order to take advantage of the Article 3 statutory powers of an
association. For example, it is meaningless to specify that a home-
owners' association has the power to "adopt and amend bylaws
and rules and regulations" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102
unless there is in fact a bona fide homeowners' association in
existence in a pre-1999 planned community. Since some of these
older planned communities operate through informal organiza-
tions, there may be some preventive law housekeeping to be done
by legal counsel. And it is assumed that a pre-1999 planned com-
munity that elects to opt in for full coverage under the PCA will
need to have a duly created and functioning homeowners'
association.
Membership in the association is required at all times to con-
sist exclusively of all the lot owners. 165 A homeowners' association
created after the effective date of the PCA must be organized as a
nonprofit corporation. 166
E. Powers of Unit Owners' Association
Because the addition of a statutory inventory of powers of the
association represents a sweeping change - paradigm shift - in
the North Carolina jurisprudence of planned communities, it is
appropriate to commence this discussion by setting forth the pow-
ers statute in its entirety. A subsection by subsection analysis
will then follow. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 reads:
The first purchaser of a unit is entitled to have in place the legal
structure of the unit owners' association. The existence of the structure
clarifies the relationship between the developer and other unit owners
and makes it easy for the developer to involve unit owners in the
governance of the planned community even during a period of declarant
control reserved pursuant to Section 3-103(d).
164. Editor's Note to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101.
165. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101. Following termination of a planned
community, membership consists of all persons entitled to distributions of
proceeds under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-188.
166. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101. The U.P.C.A. gives states adopting it the
option of requiring incorporation or allowing an unincorporated association.
Comment 2 to U.P.C.A. § 3-101. North Carolina's requirement of incorporation
is a wise one. See generally The Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55A (1993).
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Subject to the provisions of the articles of incorporation or the dec-
laration and the declarant's rights therein, the association may:
(1) Adopt and amend bylaws and rules and regulations;
(2) Adopt and amend budgets for revenues, expenditures, and
reserves and collect assessments for common expenses from
lot owners;
(3) Hire and discharge managing agents and other employees,
agents, and independent contractors;
(4) Institute, defend, or intervene in litigation or administra-
tive proceedings on matters affecting the planned community;
(5) Make contracts and incur liabilities;
(6) Regulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and
modification of common elements;
(7) Cause additional improvements to be made as a part of the
common elements;
(8) Acquire, hold, encumber, and convey in its own name any
right, title, or interest to real or personal property, provided
that common elements may be conveyed or subjected to a
security interest only pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-3-112;
(9) Grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions
through or over the common elements;
(10) Impose and receive any payments, fees, or charges for the
use, rental,or operation of the common elements other than
the limited common elements and for services provided to lot
owners;
(11) Impose reasonable charges for late payment of assess-
ments and, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, sus-
pend privileges or services provided by the association (except
rights of access to lots) during any period that assessments or
other amounts due and owing to the association remain
unpaid for a period of 30 days or longer;
(12) After notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose rea-
sonable fines or suspend privileges or services provided by the
association (except rights of access to lots) for reasonable peri-
ods for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules and
regulations of the association;
(13) Impose reasonable charges in connection with the prepa-
ration and recordation of documents, including, without limi-
tation, amendments to the declaration or statements of
unpaid assessments;
(14) Provide for the indemnification of and maintain liability
insurance for its officers, executive board, directors, employ-
ees, and agents;
(15) Assign its right to future income, including the right to
receive common expense assessments;
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(16) Exercise all other powers that may be exercised in the
State by legal entities of the same type as the association; and
(17) Exercise any other powers necessary and proper for the
governance and operation of the association.
Any discussion of the powers of a homeowners' association
under Article 3 of the PCA must revisit the applicability of the Act
to pre-1999 planned communities. 167 Subsections (1) through (6)
and (11) through (17) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102, the all
important "Powers of Owners' Association" provision, apply to all
planned communities created prior to the January 1, 1999 effec-
tive date of the PCA.16 s This point cannot be overemphasized.
The applicability of parts of Article 3 to all preexisting planned
communities raises a number of challenging issues. The author of
a treatise on retroactive land legislation introduces the area, in
part, as follows:
The term retroactive when applied to legislation has been used to
suggest a variety of meanings, but the sense in which the term is
employed here is that a statute is retroactive when it extinguishes
or impairs interests acquired under the previously existing law.
The problem to be dealt with is that of the constitutional limita-
tions on the power of the legislature to effect changes in the insti-
tutions of real property law and to make those changes applicable
as to interests arising out of these institutions and in existence at
the effective date of the statute.169
In addition, the reader is once again reminded that a pre-1999
planned community can, by following clear statutory procedures,
opt in for full coverage by Chapter 47F 70 and thereby confer upon
its association all of the powers enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-3-102. Even this "opt in" statute has an element of retroac-
167. See supra Part II.C.
168. See Editor's Note to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102. The provisions not made
applicable to pre-1999 planned communities, subsections (7) through (10) all
relate to property rights. Making them inapplicable to pre-1999 planned
communities represents a precaution against a constitutional attack by lot
owners.
169. JOHN SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN
LAND 1-2 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982). Scurlock appropriately draws a
distinction between legislation regulating land use and legislation impairing
static interests in land. His treatise does not emphasize land use, nor does it
address any aspect of community association law.
170. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(d).
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tivity to it to the extent that the procedures set forth in the Act
supercede the procedures of the pre-1999 planned community.
171
A subsection by subsection analysis of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-
3-102 is necessary to fully highlight the breadth of the powers now
held by associations in planned communities. A number of exam-
ples will also be provided. In all examples, assume that the
planned community is located in North Carolina. Assume also
that the action of the association is not only taken pursuant to
proper procedure and authority, but that, in a general sense, it is
also "reasonable." It is not the purpose of the author to provide
the reader with nothing but examples having an adverse effect on
lot owners in a planned community; however, it is important to
emphasize the effect of the many statutory powers of the associa-
tion on traditional private property rights. Finally, it should be
added that all of the examples provided are those of the author.
Experts on the PCA may and probably will add their own interpre-
tation of the "powers" provisions.
(1) The Power to Adopt and Amend Bylaws and Rules and
Regulations
A common theme runs through all of the subsections of the
PCA dealing with powers of the association: the General Assembly
has, in essence, created a private form of government with many
of the powers of public municipalities. 172 The safety valve, in the-
ory, is that this private form of government constitutes a democ-
racy operating under the mandate of a majority of lot owners.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(1) confers upon the association the
power to "adopt and amend bylaws and rules and regulations" of
the planned community.
Example. Owners purchase a home in a planned community in a
coastal resort area. They plan to live in the unit during the off
season and rent the unit during peak vacation months. There was
no prohibition on the rental of units at the time they purchased
their lots. Several years later, the homeowners' association duly
171. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(d) states in part: "To the extent the
procedures and requirements for amendment in the declaration conflict with the
provisions of this subsection, this subsection shall control with respect to any
amendment to provide that this Chapter applies to that planned community."
Thus, the procedures agreed upon for amending a declaration are in a sense
retroactively amended by the Planned Community Act.
172. The comments to the U.P.C.A. assume "the need to provide the association
with sufficient powers to exercise its 'governmental' functions as the ruling body
of the planned community." U.P.C.A. Comment 5 to U.P.C.A. § 3-102.
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amends the rules and regulations of the planned community to
prohibit the rental of individual units. This appears to constitute
a valid exercise by the association of its statutory powers under
subsection (1). The lot owners' plans, however, are now
frustrated. 173
Example. A homeowners' association revises rules and regula-
tions to reflect new aesthetic standards for the planned commu-
nity. These new standards include the requirement of prior
approval from an aesthetic committee on matters such as paint
colors, design and location of fences, and landscaping in front
yards. Subject to case law dealing with the reasonableness of aes-
thetic standards,' 7 4 the association appears to have the statutory
power to revise its rules and regulations.
While a well drafted set of governance documents for a
planned community created in the absence of a PCA might have
included the power to adopt and amend bylaws and rules and reg-
ulations, it makes a difference that there is now a specific statu-
tory imprimatur for such actions by the association.
(2) The Power to Adopt and Amend Budgets
Subsection (2) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 provides statu-
tory authority for the association to "[a]dopt and amend budgets
for revenues, expenditures, and reserves and collect assessments
for common expenses from lot owners." This association power is
no longer based on the narrow and restrictive common law rules
dealing with covenants and equitable servitudes. By their nature,
budgets must reflect current expenses. As with everything else in
life, it is inevitable that the assessments will increase through the
years to meet the needs of the planned community. This flexible
and realistic approach to the fiscal requirements of planned com-
munities provides a refreshing change from the common law rules
of property or from a total reliance on skillful draftsmanship of the
planned community documentation.
173. This example could of course go the other way: When the planned
community was created, assume the rental of units was not allowed. The
purpose of this prohibition was to encourage the development of a stable
neighborhood community. Several years later, the homeowners' association duly
amends the rules and regulations to allow the short term rental of individual
units. This appears to constitute a valid exercise by the association of its
statutory powers under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(1).
174. In the public arena, zoning restrictions aimed at the preservation of
neighborhood aesthetic features can clearly be implemented by local authorities.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).
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Example. When Robert and Sue Ferrapples purchased a
townhouse in a planned community, the annual assessment on
their unit was $352. Because of the high costs of operating a
swimming pool, health club and gated community, the association
budget for the next fiscal year includes a 100% increase in the
assessment for common expenses. The Ferrapples are legally
bound to pay the increased assessment.
Purchasers of lots or units in a planned community should be
made aware of this private taxing authority. They should also be
made to realize that the prudent operation and maintenance of a
planned community can be an expensive proposition. It is doubt-
ful that they will receive any meaningful disclosures in advance in
this regard, and, even if they do, it is equally doubtful that the
information will affect their decision to purchase in the planned
community.
(3) The Power to Hire and Discharge Agents, Employees and
Independent Contractors
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(3) authorizes associations to
"[h]ire and discharge managing agents and other employees,
agents, and independent contracts." This provision is a useful
one. Well-drafted documentation creating a planned community
would have included authorization to this effect, but it is helpful to
have the power clearly spelled out by statute.
(4) The Power to Litigate
The association is appropriately given the power by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-102(4) to "[ilnstitute, defend, or intervene in litiga-
tion or administrative proceedings on matters affecting the
planned community."1 75 Lot owners should keep in mind that the
power to litigate includes the power to assess for the cost of litiga-
tion as a common expense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(2).
Example. The State proposes to widen a two-lane highway bor-
dering on the planned community to a four-lane highway. The
extra lanes will be created on common areas that had served as a
175. The language varies slightly from U.P.C.A. § 3-102(4) which reads:
"institute, defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings in its
own name on behalf of itself or 2 or more unit owners on matters affecting the
planned community." U.P.C.A. Comment 3 to this section states: "This Act
makes clear that the association can sue or defend suits even though the suit
may involve only units as to which the association itself has no ownership
interest." The downsized language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(4) is not quite
as clear on this point.
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heavily landscaped buffer zone at one boundary of the planned
community. A majority of the unit owners want to fight the
widening project; a minority want to take the monies received
from the exercise of eminent domain and place it in a reserve fund.
The executive board of the association decides to retain a law firm
specializing in this area of law and litigate, if necessary, over this
issue. The board clearly has the power to commit even a substan-
tial amount of money to the legal proceedings.
In a recent California dispute, for example, three different
homeowners associations commenced a suit against the builder
for extensive construction related defects, including roof leaks and
structural problems. 176 Settlements in favor of the associations
totaled $14 million dollars and enabled the associations to repair
the many defects.
177
(5) The Power to Make Contracts and Incur Liabilities
It stands to reason that a planned community association
organized as a nonprofit corporation would of necessity require
"[t]he power to make contracts and incur liabilities." 7 s
(6) Power With Regard to the Common Elements
The association is given another necessary power: The power
to "[r]egulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and
modification of common elements." 7 9
Example. As initially designed, a planned community was sur-
rounded by a five-mile bridle path.'8 0 Not many members of the
planned community own horses or make use of the path, and the
association decides to pave it, turn it into a jogging and cycling
path, and prohibit horses. The association appears to have this
power.1 8 ' Whether the homeowners who purchased lots because
176. Richard Marosi, Last Seacliff Group Settles Claim Over Construction
Defects, Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1999, at B2.
177. Id. The article notes that this settlement is not the largest in Orange
County history. Previously, a 267-unit San Juan Capistrano association won
settlements totaling $26.54 million against the developer because of defective
foundations that caused extensive leaking and structural problems.
178. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(5). This is identical to its counterpart section,
U.P.C.A. § 3-102(5).
179. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(6). U.P.C.A. § 3-102(6) is identical.
180. Not to be confused with planned communities catering to single residents
that include bridal paths as amenities.
181. Other subsections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102, such as subsections (1),
(5), (7), (16) and (17) also come into play in this example.
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of the bridle path have any other potential remedies is
speculative.
(7) The Power to Make Additional Improvements
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(7) gives the association the power
to "[c]ause additional improvements to be made as a part of the
common elements." This subsection is identical to its UPCA coun-
terpart, 8 2 and represents a significant source of power that could
change the nature of the common elements and increase fees or
charges to the unit owners.
Example. A planned community has four outdoor tennis courts.
The association duly authorizes the construction of an indoor ten-
nis facility housing four additional tennis courts at a cost in the
vicinity of 1.5 million dollars. Subsection (7) appears to provide
the authority for this action.
(8) The Power to Acquire Real or Personal Property
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(8) provides that the association
has the power to "[a] cquire, hold, encumber, and convey in its own
name any right, title, or interest to real or personal property, pro-
vided that common elements may be conveyed or subjected to a
security interest only pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-3-112."
This subsection is identical to its UPCA counterpart.
1 8 3
Example. A five-acre parcel of woodlands adjoining the planned
community is placed on the market for $75,000. The association
appears to have the statutory power to acquire the acreage and
add it to the common elements.
1 8 4
(9) The Power to Grant Easements, Leases, Licenses and
Concessions
This PCA subsection grants the association the power to
"[g]rant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions through or
182. U.P.C.A. § 3-102(7).
183. U.P.C.A. § 3-102(8). U.P.C.A. Comment 4 explains: "Paragraph (8) refers
to the power granted by Section 3-112 to sell or encumber common elements
without a termination of the planned community upon a vote of the requisite
number of unit owners."
184. Query: What if the association of a planned community located in Cary,
North Carolina, decides after following proper procedures to purchase an ocean-
front cottage at Wrightsville Beach to add to the common area of the planned
community?
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over the common elements." s5 It is identical to its UPCA counter-
part. s6 UPCA Comment 4 makes it clear that these rights over
the common elements can be granted by the association without a
vote of the unit owners.1 8
7
(10) The Power to Impose and Receive Payments, Fees or
Charges
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(10) authorizes the association to
"[impose and receive any payments, fees, or charges for the use,
rental, or operation of the common elements other than the lim-
ited common elements and for services provided to lot owners." It
is substantially similar to its counterpart provision in the
UPCA.18 8
(11) The Power to Impose Reasonable Charges and Suspend
Privileges or Services
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(11) and allied statutory provi-
sions are significant ones from the standpoint of attorneys special-
izing in planned community law. It confers the power to:
[ilimpose reasonable charges for late payment of assessments and,
after notice and an opportunity to be heard, suspend privileges or
services provided by the association (except rights of access to lots)
during any period that assessments or other amounts due and
owing to the association remain unpaid for a period of 30 days or
longer.
This statutory bestowal of power to homeowners' associations,
when combined with related powers, 8 9 constitutes a critical and
far-reaching change in the law of planned communities in North
Carolina. Homeowners' associations have traditionally suffered
the figurative status of the toothless watchdog - barking admira-
bly at violators of planned community rules but too often lacking
the power, procedural guidance, comprehensive documentation,
and, ultimately, the will to take any meaningful enforcement
action. There is also a history of disputes over assessments and
185. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(9).
186. U.P.C.A. § 3-102(9).
187. U.P.C.A. Comment 4 to U.P.C.A. § 3-102.
188. U.P.C.A. § 3-102(10).
189. The package of statutes that deal with reasonable charges or fines
includes N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(11) - (13); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1. It
is important to remember that these statutory sections apply to all planned
communities, including those created prior to January 1, 1999.
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the late payment or nonpayment of assessments by dissident
property owners. In addition, the appellate courts of most states
have not been friendly to the assertion of power by homeowners'
associations. The PCA, as they say, "changes everything," and
proponents of the legislation appropriately proclaim that, from the
vantage point of the homeowners' association, the changes are for
the better. 190
Because of its importance, Subsection (11) merits careful
scrutiny. It is similar to but deviates somewhat from the counter-
part UPCA provision.191 The chief difference is the addition of the
power to the PCA to suspend privileges or services provided by the
association. Comment 5 to the UPCA provision explains the gen-
eral need for this section as follows:
The powers granted the association in paragraph (11) to impose
charges for late payment of assessments and to levy reasonable
fines for violations of the association's rules reflect the need to pro-
vide the association with sufficient powers to exercise its "govern-
mental" functions as the ruling body of the planned community.
These powers are intended to be in addition to any rights which
the association may have under other law.192
One expert on the PCA elaborates on the background of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 (11) as follows:
While many of the powers granted are quite similar to correspond-
ing provisions in the Condominium Act, several have been
expanded or contain important clarifications. Subparagraph (11)
permits the imposition of reasonable charges for late payment of
assessments. No specific dollar limitation is placed on the associa-
tion's right to impose late payment charges in order to allow the
association maximum latitude in this area. Neither this power
nor any power enumerated in § 3-102 is subject to any limitation
set forth in Chapter 24 of the General Statutes. 193
Advising a property owner in a planned community who is
disputing an assessment should be an easy - play it safe - matter.
Assessments should be paid "under protest" and then challenged
190. See Sellers, supra note 136, at 9 where Sellers introduces the powers
sections of the PCA with the heading "Good News for all Planned Communities."
191. U.P.C.A. § 3-102 grants the power to "impose charges for late payment of
assessments and, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, levy reasonable
fines for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules and regulations of the
association."
192. Comment 5 to U.P.C.A. § 3-102. This comment has been referred to at
several points in this article.
193. See Sellers supra note 130, at 9.
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either through legal procedures including litigation or the demo-
cratic process (i.e., protest the matter at a meeting of the associa-
tion and seek to elect more sympathetic members of the executive
board). But there is a catch to any legal challenge. The PCA pro-
vision on attorneys' fees combined with astute drafting of the dec-
laration with the declarant and the homeowners' association in
mind will probably preclude the awarding of attorneys' fees to a
lot owner in a planned community even if he or she has success-
fully challenged the assessment. 194
(12) The Power to Impose Fines or Suspend Privileges or
Services for Violations
In what could become one of the most thorny areas involving
the powers authorized by the PCA, subsection (12) 191 allows the
homeowners' association to "impose reasonable fines or suspend
privileges or services provided by the association (except rights of
access to lots) for reasonable periods for violations of the declara-
tion, bylaws, and rules and regulations of the association." This
can be accomplished only after "notice and an opportunity to be
heard." have been given. 196 The notion of suspending privileges or
services is not contained in the UPCA.19 7 It is a somewhat radical
idea that conspicuously shifts the balance of power in planned
community affairs to the homeowners' association. Some exam-
ples, based on recent news reports, should drive home this point.
Example. The Hush Hollow planned community has clear rules
and regulations concerning pets.19 s Each homeowner is limited to
no more than two dogs and two cats, and no stray animals are
allowed. All pets must be confined to the homeowner's lot by
194. Attorneys' fees are covered at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-120 and N.C. Gen.
Stat § 3-116(e) of the PCA.
195. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(12).
196. Id.
197. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(11)-12) are based, in part, on U.P.C.A. § 3-
102(11). That subsection of the U.P.C.A. deals only with the imposition of
charges and fines.
198. Covenants, restrictions, rules and regulations of planned communities can
and often do control the lives of residents in very specific ways. In addition to the
very common and at times controversial rules concerning pets, a community's
rules in one form or another may prohibit clothes lines, rummage or yard sales,
the parking of a boat or recreational vehicle outside of a garage or enclosure, the
rental of a room in a home to a third party, the planting of unsightly plants, the
conversion of all or part of a garage to living space, etc. Restrictions related to
pets often limit the number of pets, the categories of allowable pets, the
enclosure and leashing of pets, and the behavior of pets.
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means of a fence, leash or electric fence. Several homeowners do
not believe that cats should be confined and allow their melodic
felines to roam all over the neighborhood on their nocturnal
adventures. The homeowners ignore notices to comply with the
pet rules. After proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, the
homeowners remain firm in their convictions. These homeowners
can be charged a reasonable fine for their ongoing violation; or,
they can have privileges or services suspended. They could, for
example, be prohibited from using the planned community health
club and swimming pool until the violation is cured.' 9 9 Further-
more, they may be liable for the cost of the enforcement paperwork
and reasonable attorneys' fees of the association. 20 0
Subsection (12) does invoke the word "reasonable" in two
instances. It is safe to predict that a "reasonableness" standard
will be applied by the courts to the entire operation of this
provision.
In concluding an analysis of this subsection, it is worth under-
scoring that it is applicable to planned communities created prior
to January 1, 1999.201 There is no requirement that an older
planned community opt in to the PCA in order to receive the bene-
fits of most of the powers conferred by that Act.20 2 Through the
application of the powers section to pre-1999 planned communi-
ties, formerly impotent associations will soon discover that they
are now strong. These reinvigorated associations will probably
surprise homeowners when they start flexing their enforcement
muscles. It would be wise for homeowners associations to sched-
ule information sessions with residents to advise them of the
change in law. Attorneys representing associations should take a
proactive role in this regard and encourage a cooperative spirit in
addressing the new statutory provisions.
199. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1. See infra Part IV.F.
200. After disputes over assessments, disputes over pets seems to rank up
there in terms of frequency of disputes. In many of these instances, the rules of
the planned community are clear. Residents simply do not believe that they need
to comply with them. An unjust rule, after all, is one that can be ignored in the
"street law" of the subdivision. As has been emphasized before, there is a need
for prospective purchasers in planned communities to understand what they are
getting into. Planned communities are definitely a poor selection for free spirits.
201. See North Carolina Comment 4 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 and the
Editor's Note to that section.
202. As has been noted at numerous locations in this article, subsections (1)
through (6) and (11) through (17) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 apply to planned
communities formed prior to January 1, 1999. It is a point worth emphasizing.
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(13) The Power to Impose Reasonable Charges for
Documentation
Subsection (13) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102 might seem to
belabor the obvious; but when it comes to the imposition of
charges against individual owners, a specific enumeration of the
association's authority in this regard can only be helpful in avoid-
ing legal challenges. It is prudent, therefore, to have a statutory
provision spelling out the power of the association to "[i]mpose
reasonable charges in connection with the preparation and recor-
dation of documents, including without limitation, amendments to
the declaration or statements of unpaid assessments."2 °3
(14) The Power to Provide for Indemnification and Maintain
Liability Insurance
The association has the very necessary power to "[pirovide for
the indemnification of and maintain liability insurance for its
officers, executive board, directors, employees, and agents."20 4
This language of this provision is identical to its UPCA
counterpart.2 °5
(15) The Power to Assign Future Income
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(15) grants power to the associa-
tion to "lalssign its right to future income, including the right to
receive common expense assessments." North Carolina Comment
2 to this statute explains:
In subdivision (15), the association is granted the power to assign
its right to future income, including assessments regardless of
whether or not its declaration expressly allows such assignments.
This differs from the North Carolina Condominium Act and is
intended to facilitate the acquisition of financing by the associa-
tion, which is believed to be the primary goal of this provision.
Comment 2 could have added another insight. Subsection
(15) differs materially from its UPCA counterpart, Section 3-
102(14). That section allows the assignment of future income,
"but only to the extent the declaration expressly so provides."20 6
203. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(13). The PCA provision of necessity omits the
reference to "resale certificates" in the counterpart provision at U.P.C.A. § 3-
102(12).
204. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102(14).
205. U.P.C.A. § 3-102(13).
206. Comment 6 to U.P.C.A. § 3-102(14) sets forth the Uniform Act explanation
of the original provision:
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(16) The Exercise of Powers That May Be Exercised By
Entities of the Same Type
The association is given the power by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-
102(16) to "exercise all other powers that may be exercised in this
State by legal entities of the same type as the association." Since
all owners' associations created after the effective date of the PCA
must be organized as nonprofit corporations,2 °7 the provisions of
the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act, Chapter 55A of the
General Statutes, also have relevance in any inventory of powers
available to the association. The Nonprofit Corporation Act has a
statute enumerating "general powers" of a nonprofit corpora-
tion.20 ' The Non Profit Corporation Act states that unless the
articles of incorporation or Chapter 55A provides otherwise (and
here one would have to interject, "unless Chapter 47F provides
otherwise"20 9 ), every nonprofit corporation "has the same powers
as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry
out its affairs."210 The statute then enumerates nineteen exam-
ples or categories of powers of a nonprofit corporation.2 1' Some of
them overlap the powers enumerated in the PCA; some constitute
additional powers. The "general powers" section of the Nonprofit
Under paragraph (14), the declaration may provide for the assignment
of income of the association, including common expense assessment
income, as security for, or payment of, debts of the association. The
power may be limited in any manner specified in the declaration - for
example, the power might be limited to specified purposes such as repair
of existing structures, or to income from particular sources such as
income from tenants, or to a specified percentage of common expense
assessments. The power, in many instances, should help materially in
securing credit for the association at favorable interest rates. This
inability of associations to borrow because of a lack of assets, in spite of
its income stream, has been a significant problem.
The Uniform Act approach to this area is superior to that adopted by the PCA in
that the power to assign income may be limited by the declaration.
207. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-101.
208. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-3-02(a) (1993).
209. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-108 provides:
The principles of law and equity as well as other North Carolina
statutes (including the provisions of the North Carolina Nonprofit
Corporation Act) supplement the provisions of this Chapter, except to
the extent inconsistent with this Chapter. When these principles or
statutes are inconsistent or conflict with this Chapter, the provisions of
this Chapter will control.
210. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-3-02(a).
211. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-3-02(a)(1) - (19).
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Corporation Act also adds that it is not necessary to set forth any
of the powers enumerated in the statute.2 1
2
A recent amendment to the Nonprofit Corporation Act makes
it clear that homeowner associations have the power to distribute
surplus funds to members. The North Carolina General Assembly
amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-13-02(b)(3) to read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a corporation not oper-
ated for profit, the membership of which is limited to the owners
or occupants of real property in a condominium, cooperative hous-
ing corporation, or other real property development, having as its
primary purposes the management, operation, preservation,
maintenance, and repair of common areas and improvements
upon the legal property owned by the members and the corpora-
tion or organization, may make distribution to its members of
excess or surplus membership dues, fees, or assessments remain-
ing after the payment of or provisions for common expenses and
any prepayment of reserves; provided that these distributions are
in proportion to the dues, fees, or assessments collected from the
members.2
1 3
(17) The Right to Exercise Powers Necessary and Proper for
Governance
The final enumeration of the powers of an association should
serve as a major general source of authority. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-3-102(17) allows the association to "[elxercise any other
powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation of
the association."214 This provision, in conjunction with the pre-
ceding sixteen enumerations of power, would appear to place the
burden of proving a lack of power on the person attacking an
action of the association. It constitutes a generic assumption of
power in the day-to-day functions of the association.
F. Procedures for Fines and Suspensions
Subsections (11) and (12) of the "Powers of Owners' Associa-
tion" section of the PCA215 must be read in conjunction with N.C.
Gen. Stat. 47F-3-107.1, "[p]rocedures for fines and suspension of
planned community privileges or services." This provision cre-
212. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-3-02(b).
213. Act of Aug. 4, 1999, sec. 7, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 369.
214. A restrictive covenant or equitable servitude to this effect would clearly be
too vague to be enforceable under traditional property law rules.
215. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-102. See supra Part IV. E.
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ates, in essence, a judicial function for the homeowners' associa-
tion and also appears to be a successful attempt at interjecting
minimum standards of due process into the procedure prior to the
imposition of a fine or suspension of community privileges or serv-
ices.216 Because of the central importance of this provision, it
deserves to be set forth in full. It reads:
Unless a specific procedure for the imposition of fines or suspen-
sions of planned community privileges or services is provided for
in the declaration, a hearing shall be held before an adjudicatory
panel appointed by the executive board to determine if any lot
owner should be fined or if planned community privileges or serv-
ices should be suspended pursuant to the powers granted to the
association in N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-3-102(11) and (12). If the exec-
utive board fails to appoint an adjudicatory panel to hear such
matters, hearings under this section shall be held before the exec-
utive board. The lot owner charged shall be given notice of the
charge, opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and
notice of the decision. If it is decided that a fine should be
imposed, a fine not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00)
may be imposed for the violation and without further hearing, for
each day after the decision that the violation occurs. Such fines
shall be assessments secured by liens under N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-
3-116. If it is decided that a suspension of planned community
privileges or services should be imposed, the suspension may be
continued without further hearing until the violation or delin-
quency is cured.217
A first point that must be mentioned about the procedures for
fines and suspension statute is its applicability to "all planned
communities."218 This means that it is required of planned com-
munities whether they were created before or after the January 1,
1999 effective date of the PCA.
A second matter to emphasize about this statute is that it
operates by default where there is no specific procedure provided
for in the declaration. This raises an interesting practical consid-
eration. Should an association operate under special procedures
216. Because "property" or a "property right" of a homeowner is being taken
away by the association pursuant to statutory authorization, there is an
interesting question raised concerning whether the actions of the association are
"under color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra Part TV.D.
217. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1.
218. North Carolina Comment 1 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1 reads: "This
section is applicable to all planned communities based on the fact that the power
to fine and suspend planned community privileges or services is granted to all
planned communities under N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-3-102 (11) and (12)."
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set forth in the declaration, or should the declaration be drafted or
amended to simply refer to or conform to the statutory proce-
dures? While viewpoints can differ, it is the opinion of this author
that it would be prudent to rely on the basic and straightforward
statutory procedures. This approach is the safe one, assuring the
association that it in fact has validly imposed a fine. When it
comes to enforcing a lien on a lot because of an unpaid fine, com-
pliance with procedures set forth in the statute will be helpful to
the association's legal position.219
The North Carolina Condominium Act contains a similar pro-
vision,220 although the PCA statute has been strengthened consid-
erably in terms of the remedies of the association. The
Condominium Act provides that the condominium bylaws may
authorize a hearing and fine procedure;221 the PCA automatically
provides a statutory procedure and authorization that can be
altered by a specific procedure provided for in the declaration.222
The Condominium Act is unclear concerning ongoing violations
and appears to authorize only one $150.00 fine; 223 the PCA clearly
provides authority for a $150.00 fine for the violation and (without
further hearing) for each day that the violation continues. 224 The
Condominium Act does not contain a provision allowing the sus-
pension of community privileges or services; the PCA specifically
lists suspension as an acceptable association remedy.225
It bears repeating that the guidelines for the hearing follow
rudimentary concepts of procedural due process. Four specifics
219. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(a). See Duncan R. McPherson, Enforcing
Community Association Small Value Liens, PRAc. REAL EST. LAw., Sep. 1999, at
39 and Margaret A. Rolando, How to Enforce Small Value Liens for the
Community Association, PRAc. REAL. EST. LAw., Sep. 1999, at 49.
220. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-107.1, titled "Charges for late payments, fines."
This statute reads:
The bylaws of the association may provide for a hearing before an
adjudicatory panel to determine if a unit owner should be fined not to
exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) for a violation of the
declaration, bylaws or rules and regulations of the association. Such
panel shall accord to the party charged with the violation notice of the
charge, opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and notice of
the decision. Such a fine shall be an assessment secured by a lien under
G.S. 47C-3-116.
221. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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are covered: notice of the charge, an opportunity for the home-
owner to be heard, an opportunity to present evidence, and notice
of the decision.226 The fines and suspensions statute provides two
very effective remedies - remedies much clearer and more effec-
tive than the common law would allow. The first, a fine not to
exceed $150.00 will quickly bring most homeowners into compli-
ance because it "may be imposed for the violation and without fur-
ther hearing, for each day after the decision that the violation
occurs."227 For example, a resident who has been defying rules by
keeping his dump truck parked in his front driveway will quickly
decide to park it elsewhere. The resident who had vinyl siding
installed in total disregard of rules prohibiting it had better invest
in a crowbar. The resident with six dogs in the back yard - four
more than permitted by the rules - should ship four off to Uncle
Red and Aunt Minnie on the farm. Another way of looking at this
somewhat innocent $150.00 figure is to remember that it will total
$4,500 in a thirty-day month of noncompliance. Homeowners who
desire to fight these matters on "the principle of the thing," will
need a great deal of optimism and deep pockets. Note that the
"fines" option is only applicable to subsection (12) of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-102 dealing with violations of the declaration,
bylaws, and rules and regulations of the association. A $150/day
fine is obviously inappropriate for the late payment of assess-
ments under subsection (11) of that statute. "Reasonable charges"
for late payment can be exacted and privileges or services sus-
pended, but no fines are authorized.228 Suspensions are to last for
each day that the violation continues after the adjudicatory
panel's (or executive board's) decision.229
G. The Executive Board of the Association
In terms of governance of the planned community, the PCA
provides that an executive board may, subject to several statutory
exceptions, "act in all instances on behalf of the association."230
Consistent with the flexibility accorded to the drafter of planned
226. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107.1.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(a). With the exception of the standard of duty
of board members appointed by the declarant, this provision is substantially the
same as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-103, its counterpart in the North Carolina
Condominium Act, and U.P.C.A. § 3-103(a) and (b).
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community documents, the declaration and bylaws can further
limit the executive board's authority.23 1 In addition, there is a
statutory exception to the scope of the board's authority: It "may
not act unilaterally on behalf of the association to amend the dec-
laration [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-117], to terminate the planned
community [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-2-118], or to elect members of
the executive board or determine the qualifications, powers and
duties, or terms of office of executive board members [N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-103(f)]."23 2
In terms of the standard of care of executive board members,
the PCA unfortunately establishes a lower standard for board
members appointed by the declarant than its counterpart provi-
sion in the UPCA. The UPCA holds board members appointed by
the declarant to "the care required of fiduciaries of the unit own-
ers."233 Board members and officers elected by unit owners are
held to an "ordinary and reasonable care" standard by the
UPCA.234
The North Carolina Condominium Act places members of the
executive board "in a fiduciary relationship to the association and
unit owners."235
The PCA holds board members to the standard of care
described in the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act. Spe-
cifically, it provides: "[o]fficers shall act according to the standards
for officers of a nonprofit corporation set forth in G.S. 55A-8-42,
and members shall act according to the standards for directors of
a nonprofit corporation set forth in G.S. 55A-8-30." 236 Both stat-
utes in the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act require that
231. Id.
232. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(b). The executive board is authorized to
unilaterally fill vacancies on the board for the unexpired portion of any term.
233. U.P.C.A. § 3-103(a). The "very high standard of duty" is justified,
according to U.P.C.A. Comment 1, "because the board is vested with great power
over the property interests of unit owners, and because there is a great potential
for conflicts of interest between the unit owners and the declarant." The
U.P.C.A. approach is obviously more appropriate from the vantage point of
consumer protection.
234. Id. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 3-103 notes, in part: "This lower standard of
care should increase the willingness of unit owners to serve as officers and
members of boards."
235. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-103(a). The condominium statute further
provides that board members "shall discharge their duties in good faith, and with
that diligence and care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions."
236. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(a).
[Vol. 22:1
58
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/2
PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT
a director or officer discharge duties in good faith, with the care
that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances, and in a manner that the director or
officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.2 37
H. The Budget
The PCA provision on the approval of budgets is an example
of a clear, practical and much needed statutory procedure geared
to the special nature of planned community governance and par-
ticipation or the lack thereof by its homeowners. It provides:
Within 30 days after adoption of any proposed budget for the
planned community, the executive board shall provide to all the
lot owners a summary of the budget and a notice of the meeting to
consider ratification of the budget, including a statement that the
budget may be ratified without a quorum. The executive board
shall set a date for a meeting of the lot owners to consider ratifica-
tion of the budget, such meeting to be held not less than 10 nor
more than 60 days after mailing of the summary and notice.
There shall be no requirement that a quorum be present at the
meeting. The budget is ratified unless at that meeting a majority
of all the lot owners in the association or any larger vote specified
in the declaration rejects the budget. In the event the proposed
budget is rejected, the period budget last ratified for the lot owners
shall be continued until such time as the lot owners ratify a subse-
quent budget proposed by the executive board.2 3s
The drafters of this provision and the PCA in general under-
stood well the workings of the typical planned community. On the
crucial matter of budget, the pragmatic approach of the PCA will
assure the continuation of basic planned community services.
Note that no quorum is necessary and that owners are provided
with a specific statement to that effect. All owners receive notice
237. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55A-8-30 and 55A-8-42. Both statutes contain
additional guidelines. The North Carolina Commentary to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55A-8-30 begins by explaining that, although the word "fiduciary" is no longer
used to describe the duties of a director, there is no intent to change North
Carolina law in this area.
238. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(c). This subsection is substantially the same
as its U.P.C.A. counterpart, U.P.C.A. § 3-103(c). The PCA version adds a helpful
warning to lot owners that the budget may be ratified without a quorum. The
PCA version is almost identical to its North Carolina Condominium Act
counterpart, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-103(c). The Condominium Act sets the
notice at "not less than 14 nor more than 30 days" while the PCA reads "not less
than 10 nor more than 60 days."
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of any proposed budget and can in effect veto it by a majority vote
or larger vote if specified in the declaration. But even if the pro-
posed budget is rejected, the last ratified periodic budget contin-
ues in operation until a subsequent budget is in place.
Assessments required by the last ratified periodic budget
continue.239
It is predictable that the drafters of planned community docu-
ments will tinker with this process slightly by increasing the per-
centage of lot owners that it takes to disapprove a budget. The
higher the percentage over 50%, the greater the power of the
members of the executive board with respect to budget, although
disgruntled lot owners always have the option to remove members
of the executive board.240 This option would require a majority
vote and a quorum present at the meeting.2 41
L Declarant Control
It is typical with planned communities that the declarant con-
trols the association in the early stages of the development. A
greatly downsized PCA provision on point simply recognizes this
practice by noting that the declaration may provide for a period of
declarant control.242 Provisions from the UPCA counterpart sec-
tions that set forth a formula for the gradual transfer of control of
the association from the declarant to the unit owners and clear
guidelines for the ultimate end to declarant control were unfortu-
nately eliminated from the PCA.243 Provisions in the North Caro-
lina Condominium Act to the same effect were also dropped from
239. U.P.C.A. § 3-103, U.P.C.A. Comment 2 reads: "The provisions of
paragraph (c) permit the unit owners to disapprove any proposed budget, but a
rejection of the budget does not result in cessation of assessments until a budget
is approved. Rather, assessments continue on the basis of the last approved
periodic budget until the new budget is in effect."
240. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(b), which reads in part:
Notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the
contrary, the lot owners, by a majority vote of all persons present and
entitled to vote at any meeting of the lot owners at which a quorum is
present, may remove any member of the executive board with or without
cause, other than a member appointed by the declarant.
241. Id. "Quorums" are defined at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-109.
242. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(d).
243. U.P.C.A. § 3-103(d) provides a formula that terminates declarant
regardless of the period provided in the declaration. U.P.C.A. § 3-103(e) provides
a formula for the gradual transfer of declarant control to the unit owners.
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the PCA.244 A provision allowing the declarant to surrender the
right to appoint and remove executive board members but retain a
veto power was also rejected in the PCA.245
These revisions and deletions in the PCA follow the pattern of
the North Carolina version to substantially shift the balance of
power to the declarant, and later, to the association. The relative
power and rights - property rights - of lot owners in a North Car-
olina planned community are therefore significantly weaker than
their counterpart rights under the UPCA or the North Carolina
Condominium Act.246
There are several disadvantages to the declarant retaining
control of the planned community for too long a period of time.
Certain contracts and leases favorable to the declarant may be
terminated without penalty by the association.24 7 Any statute of
limitation affecting the homeowners' association's right of action
under the PCA for tort and contract liability of the declarant is
tolled until the period of declarant control terminates.248
J. Transfer of Special Declarant Rights
The PCA requires the lot owners to elect an executive board of
at least three members not later than the termination of any
period of declarant control.249
The method of transfer of "special declarant rights"250 is pre-
scribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-104 of the PCA. Except for
244. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-103(d) - (e). Official Comment 5 to these
provisions in the North Carolina Condominium Act, explains:
Subsection (e), in combination with subsection (d), provides for a
gradual transfer of control of the association to the unit owners from the
declarant. Such a gradual transfer is preferable to a one-time turnover
of control since it assures that the unit owners will be involved, to some
extent, in the affairs of the association from a relatively early date and
that some unit owners will acquire experience in dealing with
association matters.
245. U.P.C.A. § 3-103(d); North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47C-3-103(d).
246. As discussed at supra Part IV. G., the PCA drops the "fiduciary" standard
of declarant appointed board members.
247. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-105. See infra Part IV.K.
248. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111. See infra Part IV.R.
249. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-103(e). This provision is identical to the North
Carolina Condominium Act counterpart, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-103(f), and the
U.P.C.A. counterpart, U.P.C.A. § 3-103(f).
250. The definitions section of the PCA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(28) defines
the term as follows:
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foreclosure fact situations, declarant rights are transferred only
by the proper recordation of an instrument evidencing the trans-
fer.25 1 A transfer instrument is understandably not effective
unless it is executed by the transferee.25 2
Once again, the PCA provision has been substantially down-
sized from the counterpart provisions in the North Carolina Con-
dominium Act 253 and the UPCA.25 4
To what degree are the obligations and liabilities placed on
the declarant by the PCA transferred to a recipient of the declar-
ant's interest in a planned community? Does the declarant/trans-
feror remain liable on obligations to unit owners? What is the
liability of the transferee of the declarant's rights? What if the
transferee is an affiliate of the declarant? These and related criti-
cal issues are left unanswered in the PCA in spite of the fact that
both the UPCA and North Carolina Condominium Act address
most of them with clarity and a well balanced approach to the
rights of all involved - declarant, transferee, mortgagee, and pres-
ent and future unit owners. 255 The elimination of clear guidelines
applicable to complex legal disputes that are likely to arise is dis-
"Special declarant rights" means rights reserved for the benefit of a
declarant including, without limitation, any right (i) to complete
improvements indicated on plats and plans filed with the declaration;
(ii) to exercise any development right; (iii) to maintain sales offices,
management offices, signs advertising the planned community, and
models; (iv) to use easements through the common elements for the
purpose of making improvements within the planned community or
within real estate which may be added to the planned community; (vi) to
make the planned community subject to a master association; or (vii) to
appoint or remove any officer or executive board member of the
association or any master association during any period of declarant
control.
"Special declarant rights" may include a reservation of the right to withdraw
undeveloped land from the planned community. See Mark Petty, Reserved
Development Rights Under Uniform Common Interest Acts, 13 PROBATE AND
PROPERTY 44 (June 1999).
251. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-104.
252. Id.
253. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-104, a statute that covers almost two pages with
guidelines in lieu of the PCA's two sentences.
254. U.P.C.A. § 3-104.
255. Subsections (b) through (f) of U.P.C.A. § 3-104 are not present in the PCA.
Only subsection (a) of the U.P.C.A. version made its way into the PCA as N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-104. The North Carolina Condominium Act, at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-104 (b) - (e) contains most of the provisions of the U.P.C.A. . To
give the reader a feel for the magnitude of the omitted guidelines, the following
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turbing from the perspectives of sound preventive law and the
protection of rights of lot owners. Because in order to vindicate
their rights in these transfer fact situations, the lot owners will be
forced to turn to the courts to supply the guidance lacking in the
statute. This built in vagueness will benefit the declarant and
declarant's transferee.256
K Termination of Contracts and Leases of Declarant
There needs to be a provision allowing the association to ter-
minate certain contracts and leases entered into by the declarant
during the period of declarant control. This need arises because of
a history of abuses by declarants who took advantage of the con-
trol period to enter into long-term contracts and leases on behalf
of the association with the declarant or an affiliate of the declar-
ant.257 The PCA provision on point is a downsized version of the
UPCA. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-105 reads:
If entered into before the executive board elected by the lot owners
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 47F-3-103(e) takes office, any contract
or lease affecting or related to the planned community that is not
bona fide or was unconscionable to the lot owners at the time
entered into under the circumstances then prevailing, may be ter-
minated without penalty by the association at any time after the
excerpts from provisions of the Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-
104(b)(1) - (4) provide good samples:
(b) Upon transfer of any special declarant right, the liability of a
transferor declarant is as follows:
(1) A transferor is not relieved of any obligation or liability arising
before the transfer ...
(2) If the successor to any special declarant right is an affiliate of a
declarant . . , the transferor is jointly and severally liable with the
successor for any obligation or liability of the successor ...
(3) If a transferor retains any special declarant right, but transfers
other special declarant rights to a successor who is not an affiliate of the
declarant, the transferor is liable for any obligations or liabilities
imposed on a declarant by this chapter or by the declaration relating to
the retained special declarant rights and arising after the transfer.
(4) A transferor has no liability for any act or omission or any
breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the exercise
of a special declarant right by a successor declarant who is not an
affiliate of the transferor.
256. Some of the eliminated language deals with warranties for units in the
planned community. Since these warranty provisions were also eliminated, the
elimination of references to them in this section was a necessity.
257. See Comment 1 to the counterpart provision in the North Carolina
Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-105.
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executive board elected by the lot owners pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. 47F-3-103(e) takes office upon not less than 90 days' notice to
the other party.
Once again, provisions protecting both lot owners and the
association from the declarant have been eliminated. This is con-
sistent with the diminution of the rights and powers of lot owners
throughout the PCA. Both the UPCA and the North Carolina
Condominium Act address this area of declarant abuse with effec-
tive and clear provisions.25 The "not bona fide" and "unconsciona-
ble" language of the PCA is the third option for dealing with the
termination of contracts and leases of the declarant, but it consti-
tutes the only option in the PCA.25 9 By limiting protections to this
third option, the General Assembly has placed a relatively heavy
burden of proof on the plaintiffs in an attempt to reduce contract
and lease terminations. When, for example, is a contract "not
bona fide"? When is it "unconscionable"?
26 0
The ability of the declarant to retain control much longer than
is possible under both the UPCA and the North Carolina Condo-
minium Act may render issues under this section largely moot.
2 6 1
In terms of wishful thinking in the realm of consumer protection,
this may be an area where both plaintiffs and the courts turn to
the Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Act for guidance.2 6 2
L. Bylaws of the Association
The PCA provision on bylaws, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-106, is
almost identical to its counterpart provisions in the North Caro-
lina Condominium Act 26 3 and the UPCA.2 64 The UPCA Comment
258. U.P.C.A. § 3-105; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-105.
259. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-105 of the North Carolina Condominium Act, for
example, reads, in part, as follows:
If entered into by or on behalf of the association before the executive
board elected by the unit owners ... takes office, (1) any management
contract, employment contract, or lease of recreational or parking areas
or facilities, (2) any other contract or lease between the association and a
declarant or an affiliate of a declarant, or (3) any contract or lease that is
not bona fide or was unconscionable to the unit owners at the time
entered into under the circumstances then prevailing may be
terminated without penalty by the association...
260. As discussed at supra Part IV. G., the PCA also eliminates another
consumer protection related to this issue: the liability as fiduciaries of executive
board members appointed by the declarant.
261. See supra Part IV. I dealing with the period of declarant control.
262. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.
263. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-106.
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on point adds this background: "[blecause the Act does not require
the recordation of bylaws, it is contemplated that unrecorded
bylaws will set forth only matters related to the internal opera-
tions of the association and various 'housekeeping' matters with
respect to the planned community."265
The PCA requires that the bylaws must provide for:
(1) The number of members of the executive board and the titles of
the officers of the association;
(2) Election by the executive board of officers of the association;
(3) The qualifications, powers and duties, terms of office, and man-
ner of electing and removing executive board members and officers
and filling vacancies;
(4) Which, if any, of its powers the executive board or officers may
delegate to other persons or to a managing agent;
(5) Which of its officers may prepare, execute, certify, and record
amendments to the declaration on behalf of the association; and
(6) The method of amending the bylaws. 266
The PCA concludes the bylaws section with a catch-all provi-
sion that states that "any other matters the association deems
necessary and appropriate" may be included in the bylaws.26 7
M. Upkeep of Planned Community
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107 deals with two related topics:
upkeep of the planned community and the responsibility and
assessments for damages.268 Several preliminary points should
be kept in mind when analyzing these statutory sections. First,
concerning general maintenance obligations, the first three sub-
sections of this statute apply to all planned communities, includ-
ing those formed prior to January 1, 1999. Second, the
maintenance and upkeep obligations can be altered if "otherwise
provided in the declaration."269
In terms of maintenance, repair, or replacement, obligations
depend upon whether the property constitutes common elements,
264. U.P.C.A. § 3-106.
265. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 3-106.
266. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-106(a).
267. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-106(b).
268. The statute also deals with some collateral issues such as access. The
final sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(a) reads: "[elach lot owner shall
afford to the association and when necessary to another lot owner access through
the lot owner's lot reasonably necessary for any such maintenance, repair, or
replacement activity."
269. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(a).
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limited common elements 270 , or the individually owned lots. The
association is responsible for the common elements, owners of lots
to which limited common elements are assigned are responsible
for limited common elements, 271 and each lot owner is responsible
for his or her lot and improvements thereon. It should be repeated
that the declaration can provide otherwise. Comment 1 to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107 explains:
Subsection (a) allocates maintenance, repair and replacement
responsibilities when those responsibilities are not otherwise allo-
cated in the declaration. Responsibility for repair, maintenance or
replacement of lots, common elements or improvements thereon
may be allocated differently by express provisions in the declara-
tions or in a duly authorized and adopted amendment to the
declaration.272
Another subsection of the statute states that the association
is not liable "for maintenance, repair, and all other expenses in
connection with any real estate which has not been incorporated
into the planned community."2 73 The UPCA contains a provision
making the declarant solely responsible for "all expenses in con-
nection with real estate subject to development rights."274 This
specific language is not repeated in the PCA.
N. Responsibility and Assessments for Damages to Planned
Community Property
The PCA varies from the corresponding section of the North
Carolina Condominium Act by making lot owners legally responsi-
ble for damage to the common elements caused by them whether
or not that damage is covered by insurance provided by the associ-
270. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(a).
271. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(a). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(c)(1) is cross-
referenced for this rule. The North Carolina Condominium Act treats the repair
(but not assessments for the repair) of limited common elements differently,
although the statutory rule can be altered by the declaration. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47C-3-107(a). Likewise, under U.P.C.A. §§ 3-107 and 1-103(17), limited
common elements are treated as common elements.
272. See also Comment 1 to U.P.C.A. § 3-107 which reads, in part: "[tihe Act
permits the declaration to separate maintenance responsibility from ownership.
This is commonly done in practice."
273. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(e).
274. U.P.C.A. § 3-107(b). This subsection adds that: "[n]o other unit owner and
no other portion of the planned community is subject to a claim for payment of
those expenses." This subsection also provides that income or proceeds from real
estate subject to development rights inures to the declarant.
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ation.2 75 Damage to a lot inflicted by an agent of the association
acting in the scope of his or her activities as agent are the respon-
sibility of the association.1 6 These provisions apply to all planned
communities, whether created before or after the effective date of
the PCA.
The PCA establishes an innovative process to resolve disputes
related to damage.2 77 It sets up an adjudicatory panel and hear-
ing process. Because of the uniqueness and importance of this
statutory subsection, it is quoted in its entirety. It provides:
When the claim under subsection (b) or (c) of this section is less
than or equal to the jurisdictional amount established for small
claims by N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-210, any aggrieved party may
request that a hearing be held before an adjudicatory panel
appointed by the executive board to determine if a lot owner is
responsible for damages to any common element or the association
is responsible for damages to any lot. If the executive board fails
to appoint an adjudicatory panel to hear such matters, hearings
under this section shall be held before the executive board. Such
panel shall accord to the party charged with causing damages
notice of the charge, opportunity to be heard and to present evi-
dence, and notice of the decision. This panel may assess liability
for each damage incident against each lot owner charged or
against the association not in excess of the jurisdictional amount
established for small claims by N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-210. When the
claim under subsection (b) or (c) of this section exceeds the juris-
dictional amount established for small claims by N.C. Gen. Stat.
7A-210, liability of any lot owner charged or the association shall
be determined as otherwise provided by law. Liabilities of lot
owners determined by adjudicatory hearing or as otherwise pro-
vided by law shall be assessments secured by lien under N.C. Gen.
Stat. 47F-3-116. Liabilities of the association determined by adju-
dicatory hearing or as otherwise provided by law may be offset by
the lot owner against sums owing to the association and if so off-
275. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(b). See also Comment 2 to that statute. The
U.P.C.A. is silent on this point.
276. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(c). This subsection makes the association
liable for repair or reimbursement of the lot owner and also liable for "any losses
to the lot owner."
277. There is no corresponding provision in the U.P.C.A. The North Carolina
Condominium Act has an adjudicatory panel procedure with a jurisdictional
limit of $500.00 if the bylaws so provide. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-107(d). As
noted at supra Part IV. F, the adjudicatory panel also has jurisdiction over fines
and the suspension of planned community privileges or services.
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set, shall reduce the amount of any lien of the association against
the lot at issue.2 78
The good news about settling disputes within the governance
structure of the planned community is that the adjudicatory panel
should provide a prompt, fair and relatively inexpensive forum.
The newly empowered planned community will settle its disputes
in-house and this is as it should be. One danger, of course, is that
an adjudicatory panel appointed by the executive board might not
always be neutral and fair when weighing claims by or against the
association, but let the experiment in self-government proceed
and it can be fine tuned later. Claims of a relatively substantial
amount can be settled by this process since the small claims juris-
dictional limit is nothing to sneeze at. At present, that amount is
$4,000. Comment 4 to this subsection adds the clarification that
references in the PCA to the small claims statutes "are only for
the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional amount for adjudica-
tory hearings ... and for no other purpose. They are not intended
to nor should they be construed to incorporate any of the rules or
procedures which might be otherwise applicable to small claims
. "...",279 The adjudicatory panel procedure is not made applicable
to pre-1999 planned communities, although those that duly opt in
for coverage under the PCA will of course be subject to it.
There is nothing in this PCA provision to preclude a lot owner
or the association from taking their claim directly to the court sys-
tem. Likewise, there is no special deference owed by the courts to
the outcome of the adjudicatory panel proceeding, although one
wonders about the possibility of having a PCA rule making this
proceeding the equivalent of binding arbitration. Finally, claims
in excess of the small claims jurisdictional limit must, if not mutu-
ally resolved, go to the court system, or must they? Can the rules
and regulations of the planned community expand the procedure
to cover claims up to a higher limit? There would be no statutory
impediment to this idea.
0. Meetings of the Association
The homeowners' association is required to meet at least once
each year, and special meetings can be called by the president, a
majority of the executive board, or lot owners holding ten percent
278. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(d).
279. Comment 3 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-107(d).
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(or a lesser percentage specified in the bylaws) of the votes in the
association. 28 0 Requirements as to notice are practical and clear:
Not less than 10 nor more than 60 days in advance of any meeting,
the secretary or other officer specified in the bylaws shall cause
notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail
to the mailing address of each lot or to any other mailing address
designated in writing by the lot owner. The notice of any meeting
shall state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the
agenda, including the general nature of any proposed amendment
to the declaration or bylaws, any budget changes, and any propo-
sal to remove a director or officer. 28 '
P. Quorums for Association Meetings
The challenge with quorums in some planned communities is
succeeding in mustering a quorum. A comment to the UPCA
adds: "[tihe problem is particularly acute in the case of resort
planned communities where many owners may reside elsewhere,
often at considerable distances, for most of the year."2s2 For this
reason, the PCA quorum requirement for a meeting of the associa-
tion is very low but highly realistic. The statute on point sets
forth a quorum of 10% of the votes that may be cast for election of
the executive board.28 3
Insofar as meetings of the executive board are concerned, a
quorum is deemed present throughout the meeting if persons enti-
tled to cast 50% of the votes on that board are present at the
beginning.28 4
280. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-108.
281. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-108. This section follows the language of the
North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-108, with slight
variations in the length of notice (not less than 10 nor more than 50 days) and
the percentage of owners (20%) who can call a special meeting. U.P.C.A. § 3-108
is almost identical.
282. Comment to U.P.C.A. § 3-109.
283. N.C. Gen. Stat. §47F-3-109(a), which reads: "[u]nless the bylaws provide
otherwise, a quorum is present throughout any meeting of the association if
persons entitled to cast ten percent (10%) of the votes which may be cast for
election of the executive board are present in person or by proxy at the beginning
of the meeting." This is substantially similar to the North Carolina
Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-109(a) although the quorum is higher
[20%].
284. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-109(b). This subsection is identical to the
corresponding provisions in the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-109(b) and U.P.C.A. § 3-109(b).
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Unlike either the North Carolina Condominium Act or the
UPCA, the PCA adopts an inventive "diminishing quorum"
requirement to assure that business can eventually be duly con-
ducted at meetings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-109(c) provides:
In the event business cannot be conducted at any meeting because
a quorum is not present, that meeting may be adjourned to a later
date by the affirmative vote of a majority of those present in per-
son or by proxy. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in
the declaration or bylaws, the quorum requirement at the next
meeting shall be one-half of the quorum requirement applicable to
the meeting adjourned for lack of a quorum. This provision shall
continue to reduce the quorum by fifty percent (50%) from that
required at the previous meeting, as previously reduced, until
such time as a quorum is present and business can be conducted.
Q. Voting; Proxies
The PCA provisions addressing voting and proxies 2s 5 shed
light on the outcome of scenarios likely to arise at association
meetings. If only one of the multiple owners of a lot is present at a
meeting, he or she is entitled to cast all votes allocated to that
lot.2" 6 If multiple owners are present, the votes allocated to that
lot are cast in accordance with the agreement of a majority unless
the declaration or bylaws provide otherwise.28 7 The statute adds
that in a multiple owner situation, majority agreement is "conclu-
sively presumed if any one of the multiple owners casts the votes
allocated to that lot without protest being made promptly to the
person presiding over the meeting by any of the other owners of
the lot."28 8
Clear-cut rules and procedures on casting votes by proxy are
also included in the PCA.28 9 Another subsection of the voting and
285. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110. This statute is substantially the same as the
corresponding provisions in the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-110. Subsections (a) through (d) of this statute are substantially
the same as the corresponding provisions in U.P.C.A. § 3-110.
286. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110(a).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110(b), which reads:
Votes allocated to a lot may be cast pursuant to a proxy duly executed by
a lot owner. If a lot is owned by more than one person, each owner of the
lot may vote or register protest to the casting of votes by the other
owners of the lot through a duly executed proxy. A lot owner may not
revoke a proxy given pursuant to this section except by actual notice of
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proxies statute addresses voting by tenants occupying units in
planned communities. 290 Another subsection provides that: "[n]o
votes allocated to a lot owned by the association may be cast."291
Finally, the PCA contains guidelines for subgroup voting. Subject
to guidelines in the PCA, the declaration may authorize that on
specified issues only a defined subgroup of lot owners may vote.292
R. Tort and Contract Liability
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111, dealing with tort and contract
liability, duplicates several beneficial rules from corresponding
sections in the North Carolina Condominium Act 29 3 and UPCA294
but omits clarifications regarding the liability of the declarant for
a wrong committed during declarant control. The PCA follows the
Condominium Act almost verbatim with respect to subsections (a)
and (b) of this statute. The first subsection makes it clear that the
declarant - not the association or any lot owner - is liable for the
declarant's torts in connection with any part of the planned com-
munity where the declarant has maintenance responsibility.295
This is a helpful and necessary clarification. The second subsec-
tion requires that an action alleging a wrong by the homeowners'
association be brought against the association and not the individ-
ual lot owners.296 The final subsection tolls any statute of limita-
revocation to the person presiding over a meeting of the association. A
proxy is void if it is not dated. A proxy terminates 11 months after its
date, unless it specifies a shorter term.
290. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110(c). The U.P.C.A. Comment to U.P.C.A. § 3-
110 explains this subsection as follows:
Subsection (c) addresses an increasingly important matter in the
governance of planned communities: the role of tenants occupying units
owned by investors or other persons. Most present statutes require
voting by owners in the association. However, it may be desirable to
give lessees, rather than lessors, of units the right to vote on issues
involving day-to-day operation both because the lessees may have a
greater interest and because it is desirable to have lessees feel they are
an integral part of the planned community.
291. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110(d).
292. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-110(e), (f).
293. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-111.
294. U.P.C.A. §3-111.
295. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111(a).
296. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111(b). For an example of a tort action involving a
condominium association in another jurisdiction, see Randol v. Atkinson, 965
S.W.2d 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), where substantial fire damage occurred at a
condominium complex. The fire was caused by the use of a charcoal grill on a
wooden deck. Unit owners commenced an action against the individual unit
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tions applicable to the association's right of action under this
statutory section until the period of declarant control has termi-
nated.297 It also provides that a lot owner is not precluded from
bringing an action under this statutory section by virtue of his or
her status as a lot owner or a member of the association.29 s
The most straightforward method to demonstrate the lan-
guage that was not carried forward from the Condominium Act to
the PCA is to quote in full the missing language. The following
subsection of the corresponding statute in the Condominium Act
was not included in the PCA:
If an action is brought against the association for a wrong which
occurred during any period of declarant control, and if the associa-
tion gives the declarant[, who then controlled the association[,]
reasonable notice of and an opportunity to defend against the
action, such declarant is liable to the association:
(1) for all tort losses not covered by insurance carried by the
association suffered by the association or that unit owner, and
(2) for all losses which the association would not have
incurred but for a breach of contract. Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall be construed to impose strict or absolute liability
upon the declarant for wrongs or actions which occurred dur-
ing the period of declarant control.299
Also eliminated from the PCA version is language making the
declarant liable for litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys'
fees incurred by the association and a reference to the nature of
liens resulting from judgments against the association.30 0
owner responsible and the association for damages resulting from the fire. The
Missouri Court of Appeals found, among other things, that the Uniform
Condominium Act did not impose a duty upon the association or the developer to
prohibit the use of charcoal grills on decks in the complex. There was no
evidence that the use of charcoal grills was such a dangerous practice that the
failure of the association and developer to ban grills amounted to a breach of duty
and negligence.
297. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-111(c). This language constitutes some of the
language in the corresponding section of the North Carolina Condominium Act,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-111(d).
298. The North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-111(d)
and U.P.C.A. § 3-111 adds "or officer of the association," but this is probably
redundant since officers are also lot owners or members of the association. At the
same time, one wonders why the language was altered in the PCA.
299. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-111(c). Similar language is found at U.P.C.A. § 3-
111.
300. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-111(d).
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One objective of the statute dealing with tort and contract lia-
bility is to provide the association or lot owners with a right of
action and remedy against the declarant for losses to the plaintiff
caused by the declarant's tort or breach of contract during the
period of declarant control.3 0 1 A window of opportunity to con-
sider legal options will be reached when a homeowners' associa-
tion board controlled by the homeowners takes power. The
remedies in both the Condominium Act and the UPCA include
both damages and attorneys' fees and would tend to encourage
legal action against the declarant where a tort or breach of con-
tract occurred. The failure of the PCA to include this crucial lan-
guage represents another example of the diminishment of
consumer rights in favor of the legal position of the declarant and
will discourage independent boards and homeowners from making
declarants appropriately accountable.
S. Conveyance or Encumbrance of Common Elements
Comment 1 to UPCA § 3-112 does a skillful job of illustrating
the idea behind and need for a statutory provision clarifying the
ability of the association to convey or encumber common elements.
It reads, in part:
The ability to sell a portion of the common elements without ter-
mination of the planned community gives the regime desirable
flexibility. For example, the unit owners, some years after the ini-
tial creation of the planned community, may decide to convey
away a portion of the open space which has been reserved as a
part of the common elements because they no longer find the area
useful or because they wish to use sale proceeds to make other
improvements. Similarly, the ability to encumber common ele-
ments gives the association power to raise money for improve-
ments through the device of mortgaging the improvements
301. See Comment 2 to U.P.C.A. § 3-111, which reads as follows:
In recognition of the practical control that can (and in most cases will)
be exercised by a declarant over the affairs of the association during any
period of declarant control permitted pursuant to Section 3-103 [of the
U.P.C.A.] provides that the association or any unit owner shall have a
right of action against the declarant for any losses (including both
payment of damages and attorneys' fees) suffered by the association or
unit owner as a result of an action based upon a tort or breach of
contract. To assure that the decision to bring such an action can be
made by an executive board free from the influence of the declarant, the
subsection also provides that any statute of limitations affecting such a
right of action by the association shall be tolled until the expiration of
any period of declarant control.
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themselves. Of course, recreational improvements will frequently
not be sufficient security for a loan for their construction. Never-
theless, the ability to take a security interest in such improve-
ments may lead lenders to be more favorably disposed toward
making a loan in larger amounts and at lower interest rates.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112(a) authorizes the sale or encum-
brance of part of the common elements upon the agreement in
writing of persons holding 80% of the votes of the association and
provides that a higher percentage can be specified in the declara-
tion. A lower percentage can be specified in the declaration only if
all lots are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-112(b) states that the association can contract to
convey and convey on behalf of the lot owners. Unlike the North
Carolina Condominium Act where unit owners have an interest in
the common elements as tenants in common, there is no need for
lot owners in a PCA to execute a deed.30 2
The PCA renders void any purported conveyance, encum-
brance, or other voluntary transfer of common elements not made
pursuant to this section. 3  The final statutory subsection dealing
with this topic specifies that no conveyance or encumbrance made
pursuant to this section may deprive any lot of its rights of access
and support.
30 4
302. See Comment 1 to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112. Other than the difference
related to the deed of the common elements, the PCA statute varies in another
material way from the corresponding section in the North Carolina
Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-112. According to Comment 2 to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112:
Subsection (b) (subsection (c) in the North Carolina Condominium Act)
has been modified to clarify that if conveyance or encumbrance is
authorized by the required percentage of owners, common elements may
be conveyed or encumbered free and clear of any easements, rights of
way or claims which might be asserted by individual lot owners in or to
that common area by virtue of the declaration by virtue of their
ownership of lots.
The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112 also differs in this regard from the
language of U.P.C.A. § 3-112, although the PCA revision seems to supply a very
necessary clarification.
303. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112(c).
304. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-112(d).
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T. Insurance
The PCA contains almost two pages of insurance guidelines
and requirements for planned communities.3" 5 The common sense
approach and clarity of these insurance provisions will help
planned communities avoid many problems and unnecessary liti-
gation in predictable insurance scenarios, especially those involv-
ing property damage or destruction. If reasonably available,3 °6
property and liability insurance are required to be obtained no
later than the time of the first conveyance of a lot to someone
other than the declarant. °7 Property insurance at not less than
80% of replacement cost is to be obtained for the common elements
with the specifics of coverage provided by statute.3 0 Since the
drafters of the final version of the PCA did not include UPCA § 2-
102, a provision carefully defining unit boundaries, it will be
important for the declaration to carefully do so. 3 09 Liability insur-
ance in reasonable amounts is required covering occurrences com-
monly insured against by that category of insurance. 310 Of course
the association can carry other insurance as authorized by the
305. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113. This PCA statute on insurance follows closely
the corresponding provisions in the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-113 and U.P.C.A. § 3-113. The main exception to this observation
is that both of the other acts have provisions related to condominium units and
the need for the association to insure horizontally stacked units. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-113(b) of the North Carolina Condominium Act.
306. If not reasonably available, notice of this fact is to be given to all lot
owners. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(b).
307. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(a).
308. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(a)(1). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(c) requires
insurance policies required to be carried by this section to provide that:
(1) Each lot owner is an insured person under the policy to the extent of
the lot owner's insurable interest;
(2) The insurer waives its right to subrogation under the policy against
any lot owner or member of the lot owner's household;
(3) No act or omission by any lot owner, unless acting within the scope of
the owner's authority on behalf of the association will preclude recovery
under the policy; and
(4) If, at the time of a loss under the policy, there is other insurance in
the name of a lot owner covering the same risk covered by the policy, the
association's policy provides primary insurance.
309. Perhaps the drafters of the PCA were trying to avoid any reference to
provisions that seemed to deal with stacked condominium units. It is possible
and commonplace, however, for townhouse developments to have common walls.
In any event, boundaries between townhouse units and common areas should be
clearly described.
310. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(a)(2).
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declaration or deemed appropriate by the association. 311 Follow-
ing a consistent rule found in many parts of the PCA, the statu-
tory insurance provisions can be varied or waived if all of the lots
in the planned community are restricted to nonresidential use.312
Losses covered by the property insurance policy are payable
to the association or an insurance trustee designated for that pur-
pose and not to any mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of
trust.31 3 Funds are to be held in trust and disbursed first to
restore the damaged property. 31 4 The statute deals with other
contingencies related to options other than repair.315
Certificates or memoranda of insurance must be provided by
insurers that have issued an insurance policy, and any cancella-
tion or refusal to renew insurance must be preceded by 30 days
notice.
31 6
U. Surplus Funds
The statutory section dealing with surplus funds begins with
the six most common words in the PCA: "[u]nless otherwise pro-
vided in the declaration."317 It is likely that a well drafted decla-
ration will deal with the practical topic of surplus funds; if not,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-114 takes what should be all of the guess
work out of most potential problems. It provides (subject to the
311. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(b).
312. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(h). It is the intent of the drafters of the
U.P.C.A. that mixed-use planned communities with some residential units do not
qualify for this waiver. U.P.C.A. Comment 9 to U.P.C.A. § 3-113.
313. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(d). For a recent case from another
jurisdiction involving the destruction of most of a condominium complex by an
earthquake and entitlement to earthquake insurance, see Foothill Village
Homeowners Assoc. v. Bishop, 81 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1999). The Court of Appeal of
California, Second District, held that the lender was not entitled to earthquake
insurance proceeds since the loan documents did not require that this insurance
be purchased.
314. Id.
315. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(g).
316. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113(f).
317. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-114. This statute is almost identical to the North
Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-114 and U.P.C.A. § 3-114.
The U.P.C.A. Comment explains as follows:
Surplus funds of the association are generally used first for the pre-
payment of reserves, and remaining funds are thereafter credited to the
account of unit owners or paid to them. In some cases, however, unit
owners might prefer that surplus funds be used for other purposes (e.g.,
the purchase of recreational equipment). Accordingly, this section
permits the declaration to specify any other use of surplus funds.
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declaration providing otherwise) that "any surplus funds of the
association remaining after the payment of or provision for com-
mon expenses, the funding of reasonable operating expense sur-
plus, and any prepayment of reserves shall be paid to the lot
owners in proportion to their common expense liabilities or
credited to them to reduce their future common expense
liabilities."
V. Assessments for Common Expenses
As is the case with towns and cities, the private governments
of planned communities can not function effectively without a
clear authorization to tax its homeowners. A major shortcoming
of planned communities in existence in North Carolina prior to
the advent of the PCA was the tenuous common legal threads
upon which assessments were based, even assuming superior
draftsmanship of the planned community documents. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-115, a very compelling statutory authorization of
assessments for common expenses of the planned community, now
provides homeowners' associations with the power, procedure and
flexibility to adequately fund community needs. It is crucial to
note that this statutory section is applicable to all planned com-
munities, including those created prior to the January 1, 1999
effective date of the PCA.318
It has been accentuated throughout this article that consum-
ers - potential purchasers of lots or homes in a planned commu-
nity - should be made fully cognizant of the nature and extent of
this private taxing power before they commit themselves to
purchasing in the planned community. Educated consumers will
elect to live in planned communities in any event, because a well
designed planned community will offer numerous benefits not
available in traditional subdivisions to homeowners. But those
who purchase in ignorance and are later shocked with an annual
assessment that increases by a substantial amount will harbor
unkind opinions about those who failed to inform them of the
financial implications of living in a planned community. 19
318. Editor's Note to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115, referring to Session Laws
1998-1999, sec. 3.
319. It is the author's opinion that the real estate agent and the closing
attorney both should assume responsibility for educating the consumer. Even
though the consumer has already legally committed to purchase, it would be a
simple matter for the closing attorney to provide a pamphlet (perhaps prepared
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One of the central and fundamental consumer protections
present in the UPCA3 2' and North Carolina Condominium Act 32'
is the purchaser's right to cancel. The UPCA suggests a 15 day
time period after receipt of the public offering statement;3 22 the
Condominium Act has a seven day period.323 The drafters of the
final version of the PCA obviously bowed to industry pressure and
rejected the idea of a cooling off period, a consumer protection that
is an anathema to the real estate sales industry.
Now, to the specifics of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115. Subsec-
tion (a) of that statute allocates payment of the common assess-
ments to the declarant until the association starts making
common expense assessments. Under the PCA version, this rule
(as so many others) can be altered by providing otherwise in the
declaration. 2 4
Once made by the association, assessments must be made
annually thereafter 3 25 and be assessed in accordance with the
allocations designated in the declaration. 26 As is recommended
by the UPCA and is the rule in the North Carolina Condominium
by the bar association) or a form letter describing the benefits and detriments of
planned community living.
320. U.P.C.A. § 4-108.
321. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-108.
322. Id. The PCA also fails to adopt the public offering statement approach to
disclosures.
323. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-108.
324. The corresponding subsections of the U.P.C.A., § 3-115(a), and the North
Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(a) do not include the
.except otherwise provided in the declaration" language. Comment 1 to U.P.C.A.
§ 3-115 points out that a declarant might want to pay all common expenses for
awhile. It reads, in part:
This section contemplates that a declarant might find it advantageous,
particularly in the early stages of project development, to pay all of the
expenses of the planned community himself rather than assessing each
unit individually. Such a situation might arise, for example, where a
declarant owns most of the units in the project and wishes to avoid
billing the costs of each unit separately and crediting payment to each
unit. It might also arise in the case of a declarant who, although willing
to assume all expenses of the planned community, is unwilling to make
payments for replacement reserves or for other expenses which he
expects will ultimately be part of the association's budget.
325. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(a).
326. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(b). If common expense liabilities are
reallocated, assessments and installments not yet due are to be recalculated in
accordance with the reallocated common expense liabilities. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-3-115(O.
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Act, past-due assessments or installments bear interest at a hefty
eighteen percent per year. 27 Statutory guidelines also exist for
the assessment of expenses associated with limited common ele-
ments or any common expense or portion thereof benefiting fewer
than all the lots. 328 Insurance costs are to be assessed in propor-
tion to risk and the cost of utilities in proportion to usage. 29 In
addition, guidelines are established for an assessment to pay a
judgment against the association 330 or to pay a common expense
caused by the negligence or misconduct of any lot owner or
occupant. 33 '
W. Lien for Assessments
Except for a provision relating to attorneys' fees, the PCA
statutory section dealing with assessment liens applies to planned
communities created prior to January 1, 1999.332 Thus, the lien
for assessments in combination with the statutory authority to
assess for common expenses constitute a substantive improve-
ment in North Carolina law in terms of empowering planned com-
munities to operate an effective private government.
The central provision of the statute dealing with the lien for
assessments provides:
Any assessment levied against a lot remaining unpaid for a period
of 30 days or longer shall constitute a lien on that lot when a claim
of lien is filed of record in the office of the clerk of superior court of
the county in which the lot is located in the manner provided
herein. The association may foreclose the claim of lien in like
manner as a mortgage on real estate under power of sale under
Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes. Unless the dec-
laration otherwise provides, fees, charges, late charges, fines,
interest, and other charges imposed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
47F-3-102, 47F-3-107, 47F-3-107.1, and 47F-3-115 are enforceable
as assessments under this section.
3 3 3
327. Id. See also U.P.C.A. § 3-115(b) and the North Carolina Condominium
Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-115 which are almost identical to the PCA.
328. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(c)(1), (2) [almost identical to the U.P.C.A. and
Condominium Act counterpart subsection].
329. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(c)(3).
330. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-115(d).
331. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(e).
332. See Editor's Note to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116.
333. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(a). This provision is almost identical to the
corresponding subsection of the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-116. Both the PCA and the Condominium Act vary in several ways
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The PCA sets forth a series of rules concerning the priority of
the lien for assessments. It is prior to all liens and encumbrances
on a lot except liens and encumbrances recorded prior to the dock-
eting of the lien and liens for real estate taxes and other govern-
ment assessments. 34 This is designed to ensure prompt and
efficient enforcement of the lien.335 Like the North Carolina Con-
dominium Act provision on point, the lien does not affect the prior-
ity of mechanics' or materialmens' liens.336
Unless lien enforcement proceedings are instituted within
three years after docketing, the lien is extinguished.337 Signifi-
cantly, a judgment, decree, or order in any action brought under
this lien for assessments statute "shall include costs and reason-
able attorneys' fees for the prevailing party."338
The lien for assessments statute clarifies the rights of the par-
ties in the event of a foreclosure. It provides:
Where the holder of a first mortgage or first deed of trust of record,
or other purchaser of a lot obtains title to the lot as a result of
foreclosure of a first mortgage or first deed of trust, such pur-
chaser and its heirs, successors, and assigns, shall not be liable for
the assessments against such lot which became due prior to the
acquisition of title to such lot by such purchaser. Such unpaid
assessments shall be deemed to be common expenses collectible
from U.P.C.A. § 3-116(a). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(d) adds that this statutory
section does not prohibit other actions to recover subsection (a) funds nor does it
prohibit a deed in lieu of foreclosure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(g) sets forth
the required contents of a claim of lien.
334. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(b), a provision identical to the North Carolina
Condominium Act provision, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-116(b) and a streamlined
version of U.P.C.A. § 3-116(b).
335. See U.P.C.A. Comment 2 to U.P.C.A. § 3-116.
336. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(b).
337. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(c). This provision is identical to the
corresponding subsection in the North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47C-3-116(c) and similar to U.P.C.A. § 3-116(e).
338. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(e), a subsection not applicable to planned
communities created prior to January 1, 1999 (unless they duly opt in for
coverage under the PCA). This subsection is identical to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-
3-116(e) of the North Carolina Condominium Act and almost identical to
U.P.C.A. § 3-116(g). A cynic reviewing the PCA might note that where the
association is likely to prevail in a legal action, attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party are called for. When a consumer is likely to prevail or when the plaintiff is
likely to prevail against the declarant under other provisions of the PCA, the
attorneys' fees language is often omitted.
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from all the lot owners including such purchaser, its heirs, succes-
sors, and assigns.
3 39
X. Association Records
The PCA requires the association to keep sufficient financial
records. 34 0 Financial and other records are to be made reasonably
available for examination by a lot owner or his or her authorized
agent.3 4 ' Upon written request, the association must within ten
business days after receipt of the request furnish to the lot owner
or an authorized agent a statement setting forth the amount of
unpaid assessments and other charges against a lot.3 4 2 Signifi-
cantly, the statement is binding on the association, the executive
board, and every lot owner. 4 3
Y. Association As Trustee
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-119 34 4 is included in the PCA to pro-
tect an innocent third party in his or her dealings with the home-
owners' association only when the association is acting in a
capacity as trustee for the unit owners pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-2-118 (following termination of the planned community) or
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-113 (trustee for insurance proceeds).
Based on Section 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act,34 5 this
statute provides that, under these circumstances:
[T]he existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the
association may be assumed without inquiry. A third person is
not bound to inquire whether the association has power to act as
trustee or is properly exercising trust powers, and a third person,
without actual knowledge that the association is exceeding or
improperly exercising is powers, is fully protected in dealing with
the association as if it possessed and properly exercised the pow-
ers it purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure
the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the asso-
ciation in its capacity as trustee.
339. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(f), substantially identical to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47C-3-116(f). There is no equivalent language in the U.P.C.A..
340. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-118(a).
341. Id.
342. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-118(b).
343. Id.
344. This statute is substantially the same as corresponding provisions in the
North Carolina Condominium Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-3-119, and U.P.C.A.
§ 3-119.
345. See U.P.C.A. Comment to U.P.C.A. § 3-119.
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Z. Declaration Limits on Attorneys' Fees
The final statute in Article 3 of the PCA is a troublesome one
because of what attorneys for declarants will do with it. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-3-120, a statute with no counterpart in the North Car-
olina Condominium Act or the UPCA, authorizes the court to
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an
action to enforce provisions of the articles of incorporation, the
declaration, bylaws, or duly adopted rules and regulations. How-
ever, what the first part of the statute giveth in theory, the last
part taketh away in practice. This will be the scenario because
this authorization of reasonable attorneys' fees depends upon it
being allowed in the declaration.346
It is predictable that the apparent fairness of the statute will
quickly be decimated by the niceties of fine-tuned, declarant-ori-
ented draftsmanship. Obviously, the declaration will be drafted
by the declarant's attorney. There will be no negotiation over pro-
visions with representatives of the yet nonexistent homeowners'
association or consumers of property in the development. Subject
to those provisions of the PCA that cannot be altered, the declar-
ant's attorney at this creation stage will be in absolute control of
the legal framework for the planned community and will design a
provision in the declaration that, however disguised, will have a
chilling effect on legal actions against the declarant and the home-
owners association. This is pure and simple good lawyering and
preventive draftsmanship for one's client specifically authorized
by statute. Unless "might makes right" is acceptable public policy,
the statute is difficult to justify. The general North Carolina rule
that litigants are responsible for their own attorneys' fees would
be preferable.
V. OBSERVATIONS, REFLECTIONS, SUGGESTIONS,
AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Function of Comparisons
When this article notes that the PCA deviates from the UPCA
or the North Carolina Condominium Act, one predictable response
is: "So what!" Where is it written that the UPCA must be the
main framework of reference? It was drafted two decades ago and
346. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-120, which concludes: "the court may award
reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if recovery of attorneys' fees is
allowed in the declaration." One exception to this statute is the attorneys' fee
provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-3-116(e) (related to lien enforcement actions).
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is now obsolete in large part due to current practical requirements
and challenges that are faced in developing and operating a
planned community. To be sure, the North Carolina Condomin-
ium Act has not been warmly embraced by developers and their
attorneys who have done their best to avoid and succeeded in
avoiding the condominium format whenever possible. But this
response misses a fundamental point in terms of the process of
enacting legislation. Both the UPCA and the North Carolina Con-
dominium Act present balanced starting points for the considera-
tion of the rights, duties and obligations of all of the major players
in a planned community: declarant, homeowners' association and
homeowners. The North Carolina Condominium Act made its way
to the General Assembly through the North Carolina General
Statutes Commission. The PCA did not. When the General
Assembly, in response to input from members of the public with
very limited perspectives, altered both the PCA in wholesale fash-
ion from corresponding legislation and the UPCA, it is doubtful
that any careful policy debate went into the hundreds of altera-
tions and deletions. Builders groups apparently objected, and, as
a result, any provisions that appeared to be directly or indirectly
adverse to them in any way were altered or deleted. The con-
sumer - the North Carolina home buyer who selects a planned
community to live in - is the loser.34 7
An emphasis in this article on the rights of the consumer is
not intended to diminish the business goals and legitimate legal
perspective of the developer/declarant, the founder of the planned
community. It is the developer, as entrepreneur, who has taken a
major financial risk in order to create the new development. The
developer is willing to assume this risk because there will be a
substantial economic reward if the planned community is success-
ful. It is the author's hope that an equilibrium of perspectives can
be reached in which it is in the developer's best interest to concede
basic consumer rights and it is in the consumer's best interest to
support the developer's legitimate business goals.
B. Should the Planned Community Format be the Developer's
Top Choice?
In the "Prefatory Note" to the Uniform Planned Community
Act, the reporter warns "of the increasing and understandable
347. When one looks at the entire area of residential property transactions, the
consumer (the purchaser) is the loser generally.
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inclination of developers, in the face of changing condominium leg-
islation, to choose... alternative forms of developing multi-owner
projects." The decision to use a planned community format for
development avoids fractionalizing ownership of the common ele-
ments and the additional costs associated with compliance with
the consumer protection aspects of condominium legislation.
In North Carolina, these consumer protections are substan-
tial. Anyone who needs a review of this area should read Article 4,
"Protection of Purchasers" of Chapter 47C, the North Carolina
Condominium Act. Consumer protections abound in the form of
protections concerning development rights,34 s the purchaser's
right to cancel,349 express and implied warranties,35 0 a theory of
recovery and attorney's fees for the enforcement of consumer and
related rights,35 1 provisions related to the labeling of promotional
material,35 2 the declarant's obligation to complete certain
improvements,3 53 and a provision related to the substantial com-
pletion of units.354 As they say in the movie "Get Shorty": "Look at
me." None of these protections are applicable at the present time
to a planned community. The PCA as passed by the General
Assembly omits the all important Article 4, "Protection of Pur-
chasers," the counterpart to the same article in the North Caro-
lina Condominium Act, Chapter 47C of the General Statutes.
Referring back to the "Prefatory Note" to the Uniform
Planned Community Act, the reporter makes a significant point:
Finally, review of the common-law multi-owner projects per-
suaded the Conference that homeowner association developments,
in which the common elements are owned by the association, offer
an attractive alternative to fractionalized ownership, even in
buildings containing units divided by horizontal boundaries.
Accordingly, the Act has been drafted in a way which would per-
mit the common elements to be owned by the association, even in
a high rise building.
348. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-104.
349. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-108.
350. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47C-4-113 to -116.
351. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-117, which reads: "If a declarant or any other
person subject to this chapter fails to comply with any provision hereof or any
provision of the declaration or bylaws, any person or class of person adversely
affected by that failure has a claim for appropriate relief. The court may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party."
352. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-118.
353. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-119.
354. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-4-120.
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Back to our question: Should North Carolina developers pre-
fer the planned community form of development over the condo-
minium form? Yes. Yes. Yes. This one is what one of my
colleagues calls a "no-brainer." The PCA as enacted provides the
developer (declarant) and home owners' association with all of the
certainty and rights that were at times fuzzy under the common
law. Therefore, it is developer friendly and association friendly.
At the same time, the PCA as enacted in North Carolina elimi-
nates the entire consumer protection article.
Moreover, a development identical in physical form to a con-
dominium can be created as a planned community. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 47F-1-103(25) defines "real estate" in part as including
"parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces
that may be filled with air or water." [emphasis added] Therefore,
units can be stacked as long as all boundaries, including the upper
and lower ones, are accurately described. Why would a developer
in North Carolina now select the condominium route?
Another alternative would be to greatly limit the scope of a
condominium development and make it a part of a planned com-
munity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47C-1-103(23), the definition of
"planned community," gives the following guidance on this point:
"[or purposes of this act, neither a cooperative nor a condomin-
ium is a planned community, but real estate comprising a condo-
minium or cooperative may be part of a planned community." A
developer could therefore qualify one portion of a planned commu-
nity as a condominium, but greatly limit the area held by the con-
dominium unit owners as tenants in common.
C. Is the System of Private Governance Too Sweeping in Scope?
The PCA creates, in essence, the framework and authority for
a private government known as the owners' association. See, for
example, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47F-3-102 and 47F-3-107.1. Prior to
the passage of the PCA, homeowners' associations were relatively
weak in power. The law of covenants and equitable servitudes
favored the rights of individual property owners. In a planned
community governed by the new PCA, the balance of power has
definitely shifted in favor of the homeowners' association and
developer/declarant. While the planned community is in theory a
democracy, there is room for abuse in this system of private gov-
ernance. A change and clarification in the law was necessary, but
it remains to be seen if the pendulum has swung too far the other
way.
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In a recent article, a suggestion is made "that the whole struc-
ture of residential common interest development housing should
be re-evaluated to give more protections to homeowners by cur-
tailing some of the more stringent practices of developers and
associations."355 This is certainly not the approach of the PCA.
D. Is There Appropriate Accountability?
Because Article 4 of the Uniform Planned Community Act
was not included in the North Carolina PCA, a strong case can be
made for the conclusion that the PCA is largely a one-way street
when it comes to accountability. Unit or lot owners are locked in
to full accountability concerning their obligations; the declarant
and homeowners' association are not. Are consumers - the pur-
chasers of property in the PCA - adequately protected in likely
scenarios of what might go wrong with a planned community?
The obvious answer to this question is "no" for many of the rea-
sons discussed above.
Because "property" or a "property right" of a homeowner is
being taken away by the association pursuant to statutory author-
ization, there is an interesting question raised concerning
whether the actions of the association constitute "state action" for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That well known section of the
United States Code provides that no person acting "under color of
any statute . . .of any State" shall deprive another of any right
privilege or immunity "secured by the Constitution and the laws"
of the United States. A prerequisite to a homeowner bringing a
claim under § 1983 is that the defendant acted "under color of
state law."3 56 Four principles have been set forth by the Supreme
355. See Trognitz supra note 17, at 59. The author adds:
Some legislative initiatives already are under way. In Texas, for
instance, more than 30 bills were introduced in the legislature this year
seeking to limit the powers of homeowners associations and the costs
associated with foreclosures on common interest development units.
One piece of legislation even proposed getting rid of associations
altogether.
356. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Hyatt &
Stubblefield, supra note 5, at 601, where the authors observe:
Because community associations have the power to levy assessments
against members for common expenses and to impose sanctions for
violations of the declaration, a number of commentators have suggested
that the community association should be characterized as a "mini-
government." A few have suggested that some activities of the
community association could be or should be characterized as "state
[Vol. 22:1
86
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/2
PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT
Court to evaluate a claim of state action. As applied to a home-
owners' association, they can be summarized as follows: (1)
whether there exists a "symbiotic relationship" between the entity
(homeowners' association) and the state; (2) whether there is
"extensive regulation" of the entity by the state; (3) whether the
entity "depended on the state for funds"; and (4) whether the
entity "performs a public function. 35 7
E. Informing Prospective Purchasers
Is there an obligation to advise prospective purchasers of real
property in a PCA concerning the sweeping nature of the powers
and authority of the declarant and the homeowners' association?
Who has this obligation? Does the real estate agent, especially
when that agent denominates his or her relationship as a "dual" or
"buyer's" agent? Does the closing attorney have any duties in this
regard?
Without regard to the lack of statutory directives on point, it
will almost always be in the declarant's best interest to fully dis-
close in writing all key details about the planned community. Put
succinctly, the declarant ought to declare, to make the terms of
the planned community clearly known to prospective purhasers.
The declarant ought to painstakingly answer these and related
questions: Precisely what package of rights and obligations is the
purchaser of a lot in the planned community taking upon them-
selves? In addition to ownership of his or her lot, what other parts
of the planned community does the lot owner acquire rights to
enjoy and use? Are there parts of the planned community that the
purchaser does not acquire full rights to use? Must all amenities
be constructed?
Lawsuits are the product of frustrated expectations. It is in
the developer/declarant's best interest to make consumers - pro-
spective purchasers - fully knowledgeable about what they are
getting into when they acquire property in planned communities.
Ideally, all key disclosures should be in writing. In addition, sales
action," requiring that the association extend to property owners the
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (citations omitted.)
The authors go on to note that other commentators believe that the
application of constitution principles "could have far-reaching, undesirable
consequences from the perspective of community association administration and
judicial and legislative economy." Id.
357. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830.
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personnel should be carefully trained so as not to "puff' the devel-
oper into a lawsuit. They should be exhorted to stick to the writ-
ten descriptions and disclosures.
It is the position of this author that consumers ought to be
fully informed of the nature of a PCA. This is no different than
the position I take when a prospective purchaser is looking at a
condominium unit. Consumers should be made aware of the
nature of the legal relationship they are about to enter. They
should understand that living in a PCA is tantamount to subject-
ing yourself to a private government, albeit a form of democracy.
Put simply, you cannot do what you please in these planned com-
munities. In recent articles involving conflicts between property
owners and associations, a common theme is the ignorance of the
property owner concerning the rules and regulations and enforce-
ment mechanisms of the association.
With reference to real estate agents who purport to be "dual"
or "buyer's" agents, the answer is obvious. Before - repeat -
before the prospective purchaser commits to purchasing the prop-
erty in a PCA by signing a sales contract, that purchaser ought to
be fully informed of the nature of the PCA, the rules of the associa-
tion, the nature of special assessments, the enforcement powers of
the association, and other important details. The purchaser ought
to know what he or she is getting into, and, if the agent is doing
his or her job. It is the agent's obligation to make the details of
the PCA known to the purchaser.
As is the case in many states, the closing attorney gets
involved with the transaction after the purchaser has signed his
or her life away. Since there is an enforceable sales contract, it is
too late for the closing attorney to do much in the area of fostering
meaningful consumer awareness. In those rare instances where a
client contacts an attorney prior to signing a sales contract, the
client should be advised of the difference between ownership of an
unrestricted lot and ownership of a lot in a PCA.
F. Suggestions for Study and Possible Revision
1. Curative Provisions for Defectively Created Planned
Communities
The definition of "planned community" at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 47F-1-103(23) should be amended to encompass planned com-
munities created before January 1, 1999 that placed an express
obligation on lot owners to pay for expenses related to the common
areas whether or not that express obligation is enforceable under
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the law of covenants and equitable servitudes."' This curative
type of statute would eliminate needless litigation over whether or
not a pre-1999 development is or is not a "planned community" for
purposes of coverage of many parts of the PCA. It would also clar-
ify the right of these older developments to opt in for full coverage
under the PCA pursuant to the terms of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-
102(d).
2. Provision Empowering Generic Subdivisions to Opt In
There is what some would consider a revolutionary change in
the law of planned communities that would in the opinion of this
author have the effect of rejuvenating older "generic subdivisions"
where the property owners want to improve the conditions of their
community by becoming a planned community: The PCA should
be amended to create an "opt in" provision for non-planned com-
munity subdivisions. To provide a sense of what this change in
the law would accomplish, sample statutory language might read
as follows:
Any subdivision created prior to or after the effective date of this
Chapter may elect to make the provisions of this Chapter applica-
ble to it by amending its declaration or similar governing docu-
ment to provide that this Chapter shall apply to that subdivision.
The election to opt in for coverage of this Chapter shall be made by
affirmative vote or written agreement signed by at least eighty-
percent (80%) of the lot owners in the subdivision. To the extent
the procedures and requirements for amendment in the subdivi-
sion declaration or similar governing document conflict with the
provisions of this subsection, this subsection shall control with
respect to any amendment to provide that this Chapter applies to
that subdivision. After a successful election to opt in, the subdivi-
sion shall immediately become a "planned community" subject to
all of the provisions of this Chapter.359
358. See supra Part I. D and the discussion of Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc. A
second sentence could be added to the definition of "planned community" at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-103(23) to read: "[a] provision in a declaration or other
document creating a subdivision which expressly imposes an obligation on lot
owners to contribute to maintain, improve, or benefit other lots renders that
development a 'planned community' under this section regardless of whether the
promises related to payments by lot owners are enforceable under the law of
covenants running with the land or equitable restrictions or servitudes."
359. This subsection could be added to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47F-1-102(d) dealing
with "Applicability" of Chapter 47F. It would be most appropriate for the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission, a prestigious and neutral body, to deal
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Several examples are in order:
Example. Hummingbird Acres (HA) is a 180-lot subdivision devel-
oped in the 1960s in a suburb of a large North Carolina city. It
began as a simple development in a rural area and is now sur-
rounded by newer residential and commercial developments.
There are no common areas, per se, in HA. There is a somewhat
sorry looking plywood entrance sign in the shape of a humming-
bird hanging and often swinging in the wind from rusted chains at
the entrance. There is no homeowners' association, and there is
only haphazard enforcement of protective covenants. The over-
whelming majority of lot owners in HA have the desire to develop
a strong sense of community and ensure that the subdivision prop-
erty values do not continue to decline. Of course 100% of the lot
owners could agree to become a "planned community," but there
are several dozen who are not interested. Some of these are
absentee landlords who have started to rent homes (sometimes
creating illegal duplexes or renting to high numbers of college stu-
dents) and are interested only in the bottom line. Under the pro-
posed statutory reform, if 80% of the lot owners in HA duly opt to
become subject to Chapter 47F, the subdivision will become a
"planned community" with all of the powers and duties of a regu-
lar planned community. A newly invigorated and empowered
homeowners' association will be able to enforce restrictions with
statutory procedures and sanctions. If zoning authorities are
uninterested in enforcing the zoning laws, the association can put
a stop to illegal duplexes and overcrowded rental situations.
Homeowners can be assessed to improve the entrance to HA. The
hummingbird in its present form must go. The homeowners' asso-
ciation might consider the acquisition of several vacant lots that
are unsuitable for building but that would make an excellent com-
munity park. There would be many benefits to becoming a
planned community.
Example. Victorian Village (VV) is a subdivision consisting of 100
older homes constructed from 1920 to 1930 and a number of small
commercial buildings and several warehouses permitted under
the original restrictive covenants. It is located near the center of a
large city, and has remained a remarkably cohesive community
development in spite of economic pressures to rezone additional
parts of it for office space and parking structures. It has an active
homeowners' association, but it has relatively little power. An old
assessment covenant was well drafted in every respect but one:
assessments were limited to no more than $30.00 per annum.
with this possibility and to carefully craft language if a change in the law is
deemed in the best interests of the public.
[Vol. 22:1
90
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/2
PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT
Recently, concerns have heightened regarding security. The city
police department is fully cooperative, but is spread thin. The
association would like to fund projects to improve security, includ-
ing the installation of additional lighting and the hiring of a pri-
vate security firm to monitor the area at night. While 100% of the
lot owners could convert the development into a "planned commu-
nity," there is, as usual, a minority of a dozen or so who object.
Under the proposed amendment to the PCA, an 80% vote would
allow the residents of VV to become a "planned community" sub-
ject to Chapter 47F. Decisions to improve security and hire a
security firm, if duly adopted, could be funded with assessments.
A strong planned community association could oppose unwanted
zoning changes. One home in the development could be purchased
by the association and converted into a community center.
The 80% requirement for this transformation is a high and
challenging one to achieve in some developments, but it repre-
sents a substantial consensus.
G. The Financial Responsibility of Planned Communities
There is another aspect to the relationship between planned
communities and the greater community that merits inquiry.
Local governments are increasingly prone to delegate governmen-
tal functions and responsibilities to planned communities. As Pro-
fessor Winokur has observed:
Beginning in the 1960s, common interest communities have
become a major vehicle for shifting responsibilities previously
associated with government agencies to the private sector. As fis-
cal pressures on local governments have increased, these govern-
ments have encouraged development of common interest
communities. These communities provide substantial and costly
public facilities and services which end up being financed by devel-
opers of such servitude regimes and, ultimately, by the residents
who buy homes and pay assessments to support these amenities.
The public facilities provided range from park-like open spaces to
streets, lighting, water and sewer facilities and recreational facili-
ties. Services increasingly provided by common interest communi-
ties, but which previously have typically been provided by local
governments, include general facilities maintenance, trash collec-
tion and disposal, and snow removal. The financial responsibili-
ties of community associations are funded exclusively by the
community's residents, who are required to pay regular and spe-
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cial assessments as needed to meet association costs.3 60 (citations
omitted.)
What is wrong with the "load-shedding"361 of governmental
responsibilities on private community associations? Professor
Winokur raises valid concerns over the financial capabilities of
private associations and notes that these concerns have been
raised by other experts. Citing other commentators on community
association law,3 6 2 he raises three questions that, as applied to the
North Carolina Planned Community Act and planned communi-
ties in general, may be paraphrased as follows: What will happen
if a planned community for whatever reason is unable to perform
its maintenance and governmental functions? What entity will
step forward to take over those functions? What steps should be
taken at the state and local level to assure that planned communi-
ties have the capability and capacity to carry out their
responsibilities?
From the perspective of the North Carolina experience, there
are no clear answers in the Planned Community Act to the first
two questions. The PCA has no standards concerning the finan-
cial responsibility of planned communities. Likewise, there is no
procedure that requires another entity such as a local government
to step in and take over a financially failing development. The
final question can be answered based on history. No steps will be
taken at the state or local level to assure that planned communi-
ties are financially responsible and capable of carrying out their
responsibilities until there are major financial failures of those
entities. There is no guarantee what the governmental reaction
will be. Professor Winokur warns: "To the extent the community
association as an institution is vulnerable to financial collapse,
facilities essential to our society will be profoundly threatened.
Yet, the financial health of community associations is, under pres-
ent law, uncertain and therefore vulnerable to failure."363
360. James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role Of
Community Associations, Symposium: Common Interest Development
Communities Part III, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1138-1139 (1998).
361. Id. at 1139.
362. C. James Dowden, Community Associations and Local Governments: The
Need for Recognition and Reassessment, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 27, 28 (1989).
363. Winokur supra note 360, at 1142. He observes that a number of factors
contribute to this vulnerability, including the complexity of the economic
responsibilities involved, challenges inherent in community association politics
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H. The PCA and the Greater Community
What is the effect of the planned community on the greater
community? How do private governments affect public ones?
What is the effect of the planned community on matters of land
use and urban planning?364 What effect will a proliferation of
planned communities have on the city?
When one refers to "the greater community" in modern
America, the reference is unfortunately to what is perceived by
many to be a place that is the product of a complete lack or failure
of effective local and regional planning. The penchant of Ameri-
cans to worship and therefore construct their cities and counties
around automobiles instead of human beings has contributed to
an impersonal landscape where one-on-one encounters with fellow
members of the community are largely limited to places like the
self-service gasoline station, fast food restaurants and the Wal-
mart or K-Mart parking lot. Taking a walk or riding a bicycle can
be an ultrahazardous activity in many of America's suburbs. An
unrelenting economic pressure for the maximum development of
land is another factor that has taken precedence over rational
frameworks for the development of cities and suburbs.
North Carolina, like so many other states, now has a land-
scape of unimaginative cul-de-sac subdivisions, each with its sin-
gle entrance onto a major thoroughfare. In the country, a small
concession at the sometimes impressively bricked and landscaped
entrances to these subdivisions on two-lane highways is the addi-
tion of an extra lane for ingress and egress. This is achieved by
laying asphalt where the shoulder of the road once was. The typi-
cal generic subdivision is simply a collection of lots. It has little or
no public gathering areas, no sidewalks, and is by most measures
an impressively impersonal place.
Impersonal designs beget impersonal preferences. Consum-
ers raised with no sense of the value of social communion may
prefer the anonymous habitat of a home and not a community.3 6
and decision-making, and the limited professional competencies of participants
in common interest communities.
364. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space And Place: The Relationship Between
Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, And Gentrification,
20 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 699 (1993) (describing and critiquing "gentrification" and
adding additional thoughts "to the ongoing account of the dynamics of American
cities in the 1990s.").
365. Communities were once based, in part, around school systems, but the
neighborhood elementary school and area high school have succumbed to
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The neighborhood in the social sense thus ceases to exist as a pop-
ular preference. The trendy gated entrance to some developments
mimics the castle drawbridge. From there it is a short trip
through neighborhoods without visible people until the automatic
garage door opener is activated and the inhabiter has managed to
complete his or her commute without encountering a single fellow
member of the human race.
Not planning or failing to follow through on a plan means
ending up in a pattern of disordered land development. Local and
county governments check each tree carefully, but ignore the for-
est. The expansion of urban, suburban and rural population cen-
ters has resulted in corridors and islands of development not
based upon any clear planning priorities. The perception or con-
cept of being part of a "community" is in large part disappearing.
As one shuttles through the happenstance humdrum of modern
commercial and residential population centers, the highest score a
critic can give from the standpoint of a meaningful sense of com-
munity is "mediocre." Travel almost any interstate highway or
beltline, select any exit, and it is safe to say from a planning per-
spective that you will have arrived at a place that can be safely
described as "neither here nor there." Circumstances, politics and
an unrelenting economic pressure to develop every square foot of
America have made a mockery of meaningful, serious land use
planning.
Contemporary commercial developments in North Carolina
and elsewhere are equally offensive both aesthetically and on a
humane level.366 Some new businesses, for example, utilize the
security device of surrounding the building and commerce area
with a high chain link fence topped with barbed or piano wire.
Several new commercial developments in the county in which this
author resides boast the concentration camp fencing and large
commercial dumpsters parked openly out in front of the establish-
ment near the highway. Asphalt parking lots and the develop-
ment of business along highway corridors - often rampant over-
consolidated education facilities that operate independently of and provide little
or no identity to individual communities.
366. Even the venerable shopping mall has fallen on difficult times. It is facing
obsolescence and has been described recently as "an unlikely form of urban
blight." Richard Stradling, Reinventing The Mall, THE NEWS & OBSERVER,
October 10, 1999, at 29A.
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development - contribute to what will perhaps soon be described
as "NMU."367
One of the most famous names in city planning, C.A. Dox-
iadis, hit the nail on the head when he observed: "Today we do
exist in human cities, but it is doubtful whether we can call them
humane."368 He calls for a re-examination of the city and suggests
that we not take anything for granted in this process. He astutely
observes:
We must start our thinking process by defining how, ideally, we
would like them [cities] to be. We should use the occasion of their
failure for a thorough re-examination of the kind of city we now
have, why and where we want to go, and how we can direct our-
selves to go there.3 6 9
Doxiadis adds that, at present, "we do not have any common
goal for our city, at least not any goal that has been agreed upon
between us, and it is very doubtful whether we even have clear,
personal goals for the city."3 °7 He continues: "We are, therefore,
letting our city just happen. '37 ' He also makes a simple but tell-
ing point when he observes, in part: "every morning we start new
buildings, new towers, new highways and thus we make changes
and commit the city for generations to come."372
Planned communities, at least properly planned communities,
may be able to play a unique and positive role in the physical
development of land in America. This is the case because planned
communities do not "just happen." Each is the result of careful
thought; each has a theme. While they have their own shortcom-
ings in other categories of evaluation, the vast majority of planned
communities are just that: carefully crafted private developments
designed with a specific theme or series of themes in mind. Fre-
quently, there is a planning agenda related to a concept of "com-
munity." Unlike the planning process in public governmental
settings, the developer and investors in a major planned commu-
nity have thought through the entire process. The enlightened
self interest generated by their financial investment and profes-
sional reputation demands this. Also unlike their public counter-
367. "New Millennium Ugly."
368. C.A. DoxIADIs, ANTHROPOPOLIS- CITY FOR HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 3 (1975).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 4.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 7.
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parts, the founders of planned communities tend to follow through
on and enforce their original plan.
The developers of planned communities are, for the most part,
selling lot purchasers what they want and perceive to be missing
from unplanned subdivisions. Consumers have demonstrated a
significant demand for what is admittedly nothing but a private
microcosm of the idyllic small village that they recall from an ear-
lier time in our history.373 Planned communities tend to be pictur-
esque, with meaningful areas of open space, a community center
or centers, walking and recreation areas, and security. Whether
myth or reality, the modern planned community does offer some-
thing that consumers find attractive. As a consequence, planned
communities are becoming the most popular format for develop-
ment. While this is an over generalization, planned communities
tend to be more person friendly. The concept of a more humane
environment is achieved. 4
On the downside, planned communities can be islands or
enclaves of exclusivity where the problems that must be faced by
their public counterparts are simply kept out by a combination of
economics, restrictions and rules. If, for example, a restriction
limits homes to a minimum square footage of 3500 square feet and
requires that each lot owner purchase membership in an associ-
ated country club and clubhouse, the planned community plan-
ners have eliminated a host of the problems of modern American
society. Anyone with a half million dollars to invest in the resi-
dence and amenities is, of course, welcome.
Security, for example, ceases to be an internal matter and
evolves into a system similar to that required by the feudal lords:
keeping watch for invaders at the castle walls. Planned communi-
373. A trend that some call "new urbanism" is currently popular. This land use
philosophy is achieved by creating neighborhoods of higher than traditional
density. Homes are on small lots. There are pockets of commercial centers and
gathering places mixed in with the residential use. A small town grid pattern is
often part of the scene, as are front porches and sidewalks. According to two
experts who advocate this design approach, new urbanism "fosters more cohesive
neighborhoods where people can more easily relate to their surroundings and to
other people." Richard Stradling, Design Gurus Give Mixed Reviews, THE NEWS
& OBSERVER, October 16, 1999, at lB.
374. Bonnie Harris Hayes, Is Aliso Viejo a Design for the Future? Community's
Placing of Homes Near Work is Being Watched Closely by Other Developers, Los
Angeles Times, December 21, 1998, at Al. ["But lately, planning experts have
found that residents are expressing the cyclical need to live in a community that
has more of a soul, a spirit. A bigger heart."]
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ties are successful, in large part, because of the exclusionary
nature of their personalities.
Concern for the greater community, the greater public town
or county in which the planned community is located, can become
one hallmarked more by enlightened self interest than the better-
ment of the greater whole. To be blunt, planned communities can
be selfish places where there is little empathy for the outside
world, other than the condition of feeder public thoroughfares to
the gated entrance.
Living within the realm of a private associational government
can also limit the personal freedom of members of planned com-
munities. This important issue is discussed below.
I. The Relationship of the Planned Community to a Democracy
Private governments are fundamentally different constitu-
tional and legal entities than their public counterparts. They are
in theory private mini-democracies, but they are too often in fact
capable of arbitrary and autocratic whims. A recent New Jersey
appellate court decision is illustrative of the challenges encoun-
tered when a homeowner takes on the association on an issue cen-
tral to our democracy.
Mulligan Foundation v. Brooks375 involves a failed attempt
by a member of a planned community to succeed in a dispute with
that planned community on constitutional free speech theories.
The controversy is intriguing as much because of the issue that
was almost raised as it is because of the issues raised. The case
also serves as a catalyst to trigger an inquiry into the public policy
effect of the proliferation of planned communities on a democratic
society. What effect will the addition of hundreds of thousands of
small private formats of governance have on a system that has
375. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks, 711 A.2d 961 (N.J. App. 1998). This decision
was briefly highlighted by Phillip M. Manley in his article Free Speech vs.
Property Rights. The author introduces the topic as follows:
Privately owned entities such as shopping centers and gated
communities are becoming ever more common, replacing more
traditional communities. This trend may have ominous implications for
individual rights. Private corporate entities such as gated communities,
shopping centers, and condominiums may restrict individual rights to a
much greater extent than municipal entities. Mulligan Foundation v.
Brooks ... illustrates this.
Phillip M. Manley, Free Speech vs. Property Rights, PRAc. REAL. EST. LAw., 14
1998, at 7.
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heretofore rested in no insignificant part upon the bedrock of pub-
lic municipalities?
In a sense, Mulligan represents a highly unusual fact situa-
tion involving a planned community. The 1,500 acres of planned
and gated community, Panther Valley, is comprised of 1,200
households with a total population of approximately 4,000 per-
sons. As is typical, all property owners are members of a home-
owners association, the Panther Valley Property Owners
Association (PVPOA). PVPOA is governed by a nine-member
board of trustees elected by the members.376 It publishes a
monthly newsletter, The Panther, which identifies itself as "The
Official Communication Medium of the Panther Valley Commu-
nity."3 77 The Panther is also described as serving as "a community
bulletin board" and is mailed free of charge to all residents.378
PVPOA rules and regulations forbid "soliciting of any kind within
Panther Valley" and the newsletter is therefore regarded as "the
only effective means of communication affecting all residents of
the community."3 79 The case relates guidelines for publication
and advertising in The Panther, but suffice it to say that the news-
letter is wholly controlled by the association and articles or adver-
tising objectionable to the editor are either rejected or edited for
content.
One key to understanding Mulligan is to emphasize that the
plaintiff, Mrs. Mulligan, a homeowner in Panther Valley, is not
from a practical vantage point the true aggrieved party, rather, it
is a foundation that she established as a consequence of an unfor-
tunate incident following the death of her husband.3 0 The inci-
dent involved first aid and rescue squads, and the foundation was
established "to clarify the legal rights and obligations of such per-
sons."3s1 The association newsletter regularly prints materials
favorable to the first aid squad, and Mrs. Mulligan through her
foundation wanted to place an advertisement in it that was appar-
ently critical of the squad.38 2 Her advertisement was rejected by
the editor of The Panther, and it was suggested that she had an
376. Mulligan, 711 A.2d at 962.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Mulligan, 711 A.2d at 962.
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alternative of writing a letter to the editor.3 8 3 There was a guide-
line added, however, that any such letter would be edited and that
only "constructive" articles would be published. 4
Mrs. Mulligan's foundation sued the association seeking the
remedy of requiring The Panther to publish the advertisement
dealing with the first aid squad.38 5 The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's entry of summary judgment against the founda-
tion and rejected all of the plaintiffs theories relating to a viola-
tion of constitutional guarantees of free speech.38 6 The basis for
the rejection under both federal and state constitutional law was
the principle that there is no right of free speech on private prop-
erty. 7 The court concludes, in part, on this issue:
Without considering the reasonableness of the restrictions or limi-
tation defendants placed on plaintiffs "advertisement," we con-
clude that the normal uses of the property, the absence of
invitation for public use, and the type of speech involved here do
not compel us to limit defendants' rights as owners of private
property. 3
8 8
The intriguing issue that was "almost raised" in Mulligan
relates to the rights of a member of a planned community based
on planned community governance documents and principles
rather than constitutional theories. At least by hindsight, a tacti-
cal error was committed by the plaintiff when she opted to have
the foundation serve as plaintiff and failed to include herself as
plaintiff in her individual capacity as a homeowner in the commu-
nity. (She made a belated attempt to add herself as plaintiff after
summary judgment was entered.) While the trial judge hearing
the summary judgment motion indicated that the result would not
have been any different had she been added as plaintiff, the appel-
late court was justifiably more cautious.3 9 Did Mrs. Mulligan
have an individual right, a right in her capacity as a member of
the homeowners association, to have her views published in the
association newsletter? Did the association owe her any legal obli-
gation concerning this matter based on the documents establish-
383. Id. at 963.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 961.
386. Id. at 964.
387. Id. The court cited Middle East v. J.M.B., 650 A.2d 757 (1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
388. Mulligan, 711 A.2d at 967.
389. Id.
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ing and governing the planned community? Was a specific bylaw
violated? The appellate court justifiably deemed it "both unneces-
sary and unwise to decide the interesting and difficult question"
concerning Mrs. Mulligan's individual rights, if any.39 °
Finally, the Mulligan case raises by implication public policy
issues concerning the impact of a proliferation of private planned
communities throughout this country. Rights taken for granted in
a public governmental context may not exist on private property.
This does not suggest that the actions of private communities are
immune from constitutional scrutiny.391 While most courts have
not found state action in the private enforcement of restrictive
covenants,3 92 they might be more inclined to review the private
enforcement of rules and regulations enacted pursuant to state
enabling legislation such as the Planned Community Act.
J. Scope of Judicial Review
What is the appropriate scope of judicial review of planned
community decisions? Clearly, the narrow, strict constructionist
approach of the law of covenants and equitable servitudes is no
longer applicable because a sweeping statutory foundation for the
power of the homeowners' association and its rules, regulations,
assessments and sanctions now exists. Consider the following
examples:
Example. Sea Shore Dunes is a planned community consisting of
144 townhouse units and several acres of common area. The
homeowners' association votes to construct a large swimming pool
abutting the front of six of the units. Those unit owners object to
the adverse effect that the pool will have on their units. They com-
390. Id.
391. See Sklar, supra note 34, at § 1.6 ("In addition to statutory constraints
placed on a board's rulemaking authority, constitutional constraints are another
form of public policy consideration to take into account when analyzing a
proposed board-promulgated rule or regulation.") (citing The Rule of Law in
Residential Associations, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 472 (1985); Weekland, Condominium
Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 297
(1986); Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 1 (Spring 1984)).
392. See Sklar, supra note 34, at § 1.6, citing several Florida cases involving
condominium developments and noting that this rule does not apply to racial and
other suspect classifications.
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mence an action in state court to enjoin the construction of the
pool.
3 93
Example. Coastal Swamp is a large planned community that
includes a championship golf course, an indoor tennis complex,
and a large clubhouse for members. After a series of loud and late
parties, the homeowners' association passes a rule prohibiting
alcoholic beverages on the golf course, in the tennis courts, and in
the clubhouse. Several dozen residents retain an attorney to chal-
lenge the validity of the rule and enjoin enforcement of it.3 9 4
The appropriate scope of judicial review is not addressed in
the PCA,395 and it is a challenging one to tackle because of the
uniqueness of the entity. A search for analogous legal models does
not reveal a perfect fit. The Supreme Court of California recently
observed:
Our existing jurisprudence specifically addressing the governance
of common interest developments is not voluminous. While we
have not previously examined the question of what standard or
test generally governs judicial review of decisions made by the
board of directors of a community association, we have examined
related questions. 3
9 6
393. Example 1 is based on Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1974) and the discussion of that case in a 1992 law journal article. See
Brower, supra note 21 at 232-33, where the author describes the case as follows:
Rywalt v. Writer Corp. typifies internal reasonableness review. In
Rywalt, two subdivison homeowners challenged the association's plans
to build a second tennis court in the common area abutting their back
yards. The court examined the relevant sections of the subdivision's
governing documents and concluded that the tennis court decision fell
within the broad grant of authority given the homeowners' association.
The bylaws of the association permitted the board of directors to
exercise all powers, duties, and authority not expressly reserved to the
individual members in other parts of the governing documents. Given
these expansive powers and the lack of specific procedures for board
activity in the documents, the court upheld the association's action,
despite some procedural irregularities in the decisionmaking process.
394. Example 2 is based on Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), and the discussion of that case by Brower. See Brower,
supra note 21 at 233. The Florida appellate court upheld the rule.
395. It is also not addressed in either the U.P.C.A. or the North Carolina
Condominium Act.
396. Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn., 980 P.2d
940 (Cal. 1999). The court went on to hold that a condominium association
board's decision to use secondary, rather than primary, treatment in responding
to a termite problem in the development was subject to deferential review.
According to the California Supreme Court, the termite problem was a matter
entrusted to the discretion of the Board under state law. Where the Board acted
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Designing an appropriate formula for judicial review must
take into account several distinct questions. First, what is the
nature of the planned community itself? Second, what is the
nature of the decision or action that is the subject of judicial
review?
What is a planned community? When a homeowners' associa-
tion has taken an action, altered a rule, suspended the privileges
of a resident, acquired additional land, or adopted a budget, what
kind of entity has taken action? "Well," a law student responding
to this question might propose, "a nonprofit corporation has taken
an action. Review of planned community decisions should there-
fore model after review of an action by a Chapter 55A nonprofit
association."
The professor responds, "Good, but while the homeowners'
association is a nonprofit corporation, doesn't it function as some-
thing that is in fact and in law much more than just that?"
"O.K.," the law student concedes, "a homeowners' association
is also a statutory entity obtaining its powers and identity chiefly
from Chapter 47F of the General Statutes. There is no need to
search for an existing term; the format is unique."
While the law student's analysis is moving closer to the mark,
an important element is still absent. "I know," another talented
law student blurts out, "this association is operating in some
respects at least much like a small city. If its actions are govern-
mental in nature, then the court ought to be reviewing them in
much the same way that it reviews a decision by a town affecting
the personal or property rights of its citizens."
To this dialogue one could add a reference to traditional law:
The association is an entity formed, in part, within a contractual
and property law framework.
But to characterize a planned community as a legal smorgas-
bord of nonprofit corporation/Chatper 47F/private government/
contractual/property law entity is still incomplete until one super-
imposes the word "community" on the description. "Community"
means many things and countless varieties of things, but it sym-
bolizes a dynamic that should not be ignored by a reviewing court.
The fact that a dispute constitutes a "community" dispute is
relevant.
upon a reasonable investigation, acted in good faith, and proceeded in a manner
that it believed to be in the best interests of the Association and its members, the
trial court was correct in deferring to the Board's decision.
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Assume for purposes of discussion that we have come to grips
with accurately categorizing the legal framework of the planned
community. In terms of the appropriate standard for judicial
review, our inquiry must now shift to the nature of the dispute.
Assuming also that almost all disputes being reviewed by the
court will involve challenges by lot owners of community govern-
ance decisions, policies, or the enforcement of those policies, the
specific nature of the decision or policy involved is significant.
Contrast, for example, a homeowners' association action to collect
an annual assessment with an action to collect a fine because a lot
owner has posted a political campaign sign in his or her window in
violation of a recently enacted association rule prohibiting all
signs.
This being said, there are some fundamental checkpoints in
any judicial review fact situation. First, the authority of the asso-
ciation to enact the rule or regulation involved must be identified.
In most instances, the requisite authority will be located in the
"powers" section of the PCA or in the governing documents of the
planned community. Either source of authority should be legally
sufficient. 97 Next, the association must demonstrate that it has
followed the appropriate procedure for enactment of the rule or
regulation that it is now seeking to enforce. Since so many home-
owner association board positions are occupied by well intentioned
amateurs - part-time volunteers - honest but substantial proce-
dural mistakes are not rare occurrences.
Once it is demonstrated that both authority is present and
proper procedure was followed, the association should enjoy a
great deal of leeway from the standpoint of judicial review. One
commentator identifies the options for the standard of judicial
review as based on either reasonableness, business judgment or a
contractarian approach. 9 s Several public policy justifications
exist for laissez-faireism on the part of the courts. As has been
emphasized throughout this article, a planned community is by
definition an encroachment upon pure private property ownership
rights. A decision to reside in one is an agreement to abide by
duly enacted rules and regulations of the association. In addition,
397. The planned community's governing documents could, of course, restrict
or negate some of the powers granted by statute. In that event, subject to public
policy concerns, the provisions in the documents would be honored by a
reviewing court.
398. Michael R. Fierro, Condominium Association Remedies Against A
Recalcitrant Unit Owner, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 247, 251-252 (1999).
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courts already burdened with backlogs of a litigious society will be
less than enthusiastic about second guessing the private decisions
and enforcement actions of neighborhood associations.
K Final Thoughts
It can be said that an attorney's (or law professor's) way of
analyzing and interpreting a law reveals as much about him or
her as the contents of the statute. A dozen seasoned real estate
experts will no doubt come up with a dozen different perspectives
on what the Planned Community Act means and what effect it will
have on the rights of individual homeowners and the greater com-
munity. It is safe to add that, when those dozen experts reflect on
the same statutory language after several years of real life experi-
ence with the operation of planned communities under the new
statutory regime, their initial impressions and critiques will
become refined and in some instances changed.
In practice, many of the provisions of the PCA that bring
authority and certainty to the private governments of the new mil-
lenium will be beneficial to all involved. Investors, developers,
declarants, lenders, homeowners' associations and home owners
will benefit from clear and practical rules that anticipate common
problems and challenges to planned community operations. The-
ory and experience in North Carolina will eventually demonstrate
whether the marked shift in the balance of power from home-
owner to declarant and association is a serious problem in need of
correction. This author obviously believes that to be the case.
In any event, the effect of the new Planned Community Act on
consumers, homeowners' associations, declarants, the planned
community as a whole, and the greater public community that we
are all members of should be regularly and closely monitored.
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